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REVISITING THE HANDMAID’S TALE:  
FEMINIST THEORY MEETS EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH ON SURROGATE MOTHERS  
 
Karen Busby and Delaney Vun 
 
Abstract:  After briefly reviewing laws on surrogate 
motherhood in Canada, the United States, and Britain, the 
authors consider nearly 40 empirical research studies on the 
characteristics and experiences of women who have been 
surrogate mothers.  Empiricism meets feminist theory as we 
revisit arguments against surrogacy arrangements, including 
the inability to give informed consent, the inherently 
exploitative nature of the arrangements, and the dangers of 
commodification.  In light of our observations based on the  
empirical research, we argue that it may be time to review 
Canadian surrogacy laws.  
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Margaret Atwood’s powerful 1985 novel, The Handmaid’s 
Tale, speculates about a near future in Gilead (formerly the 
United States), a country ruled by a puritanical theocracy.  
Most adults are infertile because of pollution, radiation and 
disease.   According to the Biblical story, the original Gilead is 
the place where, according to the Biblical story, Joseph and the 
four women (two wives and two slaves) with whom he had 
children settled.  Fertile women in the modern Gilead are 
forced to be “handmaids”, the term used in one translation to 
describe Joseph’s slaves, who had been impregnated by 
powerful men.  The children of these unions were raised as the 
offspring of that man and his wife.  Other Biblically-based 
Gileadean pro-natalist laws make it a capital offence to engage 
in non-reproductive sex or to have an abortion, unless the fetus 
evidences a disability.  In Atwood’s novel, a handmaid narrates 
her story onto audiotapes because women are forbidden to read 
or write.  Personal voice and oral history have long been used 
by marginalized people to make some sense of their 
predicament. Many feminist scholars understand The 
Handmaid’s Tale to be a novel about the exploitative, de-
humanizing elements of surrogate motherhood.1   
  
                                                     
1  Richard F. Storrow, “The Handmaid’s Tale of Fertility Tourism:  
Passports and Third Parties in the Religious Regulation of Assisted 
Conception” (2005) 12 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 189, citing, for 
example,  Helene Michie & Naomi R. Cahn, “Confinements and 
Fertility and Infertility in Contemporary Culture” (1997) and Linda 
Mysiades, “Law, Medicine, and the Sex Slave in Margaret Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale” in Kostas Myrsiades & Linda Myrsiades, eds., 
Undisciplining Literature: Literature, Law and Culture (New York: 
Peter Lang New York, 1999). Storrow’s article also has an interesting 
review of Egyptian and Muslim law related to surrogacy 
arrangements. 
 




In early 1986, American Mary Beth Whitehead gave 
birth to a child conceived by artificial insemination, using her 
egg and the commissioning father’s sperm.  She had signed a 
surrogacy contract to give up all parental rights and she was to 
receive $10,000 as compensation. Shortly after the birth, she 
determined that she could not give up the child and a lawsuit, 
In the Matter of Baby M,2 ensued between the two genetic 
parents.  At the trial in 1987, her fitness as a parent was 
questioned on rather dubious criteria.  Experts criticized her 
choice of stuffed teddy bears as toys and how she played “patty 
cake” with M. They also stated that she had a narcissistic 
personality and used her dyed hair to support their diagnosis.3  
The court, after finding that there was a binding contract, 
ordered the termination of Whitehead’s parental rights, gave 
custody to the commissioning father, and permitted him and his 
wife to immediately adopt the child.  On appeal in 1988, the 
court held the contract was void. The appeal court stated that a  
surrogate mother could not give meaningful consent to 
relinquish a child until after the child was born and that it is 
illegal to pay someone to be a surrogate or to sell a baby. 
Therefore, the court rescinded the adoption.  Using the “best 
interests of the child” test, it held that the commissioning father 
should have custody (finding that his home was more stable 
                                                     
2  In the Matter of Baby M. 217 N.J. Super 313 (Ch. Div. 1987) rev’d 
109 N.J. 396 (1988). 
3  More than 100 prominent feminists, including Betty Freidan, Meryl 
Streep, Gloria Steinem and Phyllis Chesler, signed a statement titled 
“By these standards we are all unfit mothers”, criticizing the expert 
evidence presented on Whitehead’s mothering skills.  See also Iver 
Peterson, “Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say”, 
The New York Times (20 March 1987), online: The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/20/nyregion/fitness-test-for-baby-
m-s-mother-unfair-feminists-say.html and Phyllis Chesler, The 
Sacred Bond: The Legacy of the Baby M Case (New York: Times 
Books, 1988). 
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and financially secure) and the surrogate mother should have 
visitation rights.  The Baby M case ignited a firestorm of public 
and academic debates on the ethics of commercial surrogacy 
arrangements.  Feminists were almost uniformly supportive of 
the surrogate mother.  The Handmaid’s Tale and the Baby M 
case both served as influential cautionary tales of women in 
imaginary and real regimes that forced them to become, as 
described by one of Atwood’s characters, “sacred vessels, 
ambulatory chalices”,4 or, in other words, surrogate mothers.   
 
The Canadian government formed the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (“RCNRT”) 
in 1989 and reported in 1993.  It recommended prohibiting all 
surrogacy arrangements on pain of significant criminal 
sanctions, asserting that women could not give true consent to 
relinquish parental rights and that the practice exploited 
vulnerable women and would commodify women and 
children.5  The RCNRT’s analysis reflected most popular and 
academic feminist thinking in Canada and the United States6 in 
                                                     
4   Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (Toronto: Random House, 
1986) at 196.  
5  Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed 
with Care:  Final Report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, vol. 2 (Ottawa:  Minister of Government 
Services Canada, 1993) [RCNRT] at, for example, xxxii, 15, 22, 52, 
107, 199, and Recommendations 199-205.  
6  Canadian feminists who opposed surrogacy included Christine 
Overall, see Human Reproduction: Principles, Practices and Policies 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) [Overall, “Human 
Reproduction”] and Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist 
Analysis (Allen & Unwin: Boston, 1987) [Overall, “A Feminist 
Analysis”]; Somer Brodribb, see “Off the Pedastal and Onto the 
Block”, (1986) 1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law/Review 
“Femmes et Droit” 407;  Michele Landsberg, see “Baby M decision 
backing an inhumane practice” Globe and Mail (4 April 1987) A2;  
Margrit Eichler, see “Reflections on the ‘Temporary Use of Normally 
Functioning Uteri’” in Gwen Basen, Margrit Eichler, & Abby 




the 1980s and early1990s.  For example, Christine Overall, an 
influential feminist ethicist, questioned whether the choice to 
enter a surrogate contract could be a free one and postulated 
that it is impossible for a surrogate to be fully informed of the 
full potential of the traumas they could experience upon 
surrender of the child. She asserted that surrogate mothers 
“often have little education, little or no income, and very little 
personal security” and are therefore ripe for exploitation.  She 
described the practice as “reproductive prostitution”7 and stated 
that “the argument here is not that selling babies leads, via the 
slippery slope, to slavery; the claim is that the practice is 
                                                                                                       
Lippman, eds., Misconceptions: The Social Construction of Choice 
and New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies (Hull, Quebec: 
Voyaguer, 1993); Diana Majury, see “Pre-Conception Contracts: 
Giving the Mother an Option” in Simon Rosenfeld & Peter Findlay, 
eds., Debating Canada’s Future: Views from the Left (Toronto: 
James Lorimer & Co., 1991); and Susan Sherwin, see “Some 
Reflections on ‘Surrogacy’” in Basen, Eichler, & Lippman. American 
feminists opposing surrogacy included: Mary Lyndon Shanley, see 
“‘Surrogate Mothering’ and Women’s Freedom: A Critique of 
Contracts for Human Reproduction” (1993) 18 Signs 618; Martha 
Field, see Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Janice Raymond, see 
Women As Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over 
Women’s Freedom (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993); Chesler, 
supra note 3; Barbara Katz Rothman, see Recreating Motherhood, 
Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1989); Anita L. Allen, see “The Socio-Economic Struggle for 
Equality: The Black Surrogate Mother” (1991) Harvard Blackletter J. 
17; Gena Corea, see The Mother Machine: Reproductive 
Technologies From Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1985); and see Linda & Whiteford and Mary L. 
Poland, eds., New Approaches to Human Reproduction: Social and 
Ethical Dimensions (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1989).  (Most of 
the authors in this text illustrate this point). 
7  Overall, “A Feminist Analysis”, supra note 6, at 1 and 116-118. 
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slavery” and she concluded that even if a regulatory regime 
protects the rights of surrogate mothers it “is incompatible with 
the vision of women as equal, autonomous, and valued 
members of this culture”.8  Early in the debate, few feminist 
voices asserted that women should have the autonomy to make 
the choice to be a surrogate mother.9  Once it became apparent 
that prohibition coupled with criminal sanctions was the path 
likely to be taken in Canada, some noted the dangers of 
criminalizing the behaviour of marginalized groups.10 
  
Attitudinal surveys also indicated that there was little 
public support for surrogacy in Canada and elsewhere in the 
1990s.  Vijaya Krishnan’s 1994 survey of more than 5,300 
Canadian women of reproductive age found that, while 24 
percent of those surveyed approved of commercial surrogacy, 
42 percent strongly disapproved.  S.J. Genius et al. found in a 
1993 survey of 455 Edmontonians that 85 percent were 
                                                     
8  Overall, “Human Reproduction”, supra note 6, at 124 and 131. 
9   One early proponent of autonomy and choice was Carmel Shalev, see 
Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy” (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989). 
10  The National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), while 
stressing that it did not “condone” surrogacy, submitted to a 
Parliamentary Committee in April 1997 that criminal approaches 
were too heavy handed.  See the evidence of Diana Majury and Diana 
Ginn, on behalf of NAWL, online:  <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
35/Archives/committees352/srta/evidence/07_97-04-10/srta07_blk10 
1.html>.  See also, Majury, supra note 6, Mariana Valverde & Lorna 
Weir, “Regulating New Reproductive and Genetic Technologies: A 
Feminist View of Recent Canadian Government Initiatives” (1997) 
23 Feminist Studies 418, and Alison Harvison Young & Angela 
Wasunna, “Wrestling with the Limits of the Law: Regulating New 
Reproductive Technologies” (1998) 6 Health Law J. 239.  




opposed to surrogacy if commissioning mothers used surrogacy 
simply to avoid the inconvenience of pregnancy.11 
  
 Despite the cautionary tales, early feminist thinking 
and public opinion and a 2004 criminal law in Canada 
prohibiting commercial surrogacy (discussed below), surrogacy 
arrangements have persisted as a method of family formation 
and seem to be here to stay.  Reliable statistics on how many 
surrogacy arrangements are entered into are not available, but 
the web sites of American and British surrogacy organizations 
boast of making hundreds of connections and that at least 
25,000 babies have been born to surrogate mothers in the 
United States alone.12  The growing reproductive tourism 
                                                     
11  Vajaya Krishnan, “Attitudes toward surrogate motherhood in 
Canada” (1994) 15 Health Care for Women International 333 and S.J. 
Genius, S.K. Chang, & S.K. Genius, “Public Attitudes in Edmonton 
toward assisted human reproduction” (1993) 150 Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 701.  See also Aimee Poote & Olga van den 
Akker, “British women’s attitudes to surrogacy” (2009) 24 Human 
Reproduction 139 and G. Wiess, “Public Attitudes about Surrogate 
Motherhood” (1992) 6 Michigan Sociological Review 15. 
12  For example, Lim Ai Lee, reports that “[a]ccording to reports quoting 
industry experts, over 1,000 surrogate births took place in the United 
States last year, and it is believed the number has increased since the 
recession, as more cash-strapped women turn to surrogacy to ease 
their financial burden”:   “Surrogacy way to survive the hard times” 
The [Malaysia] Star (June 29, 2009), online: Star http:// 
thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2009/6/27/columnists/state    
side/4187899&sec=stateside.  It is not clear whether this figure 
include situations where the parties concluded arrangements without 
any third party assistance. Elly Teman, acknowledges that accurate 
estimates are impossible because so many informal arrangements take 
place and she reports that, at least, 25,000 children have been born by 
surrogates in the United States: “The Social Construction of 
Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the 
Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood” (2008) 67 
Social Science & Medicine 1104.  Childlessness Overcome Through 
Surrogacy (COTS) (a British organization celebrated its 600th birth in 
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industry in India is worth more than $450 million (US).13  
Hardly a week goes by without the tabloids featuring a 
celebrity holding a child borne of a surrogate mother or 
television programs about the practice.14  On-line surrogacy 
organizations connecting would-be surrogate mothers with 
commissioning parents are numerous and ads offering or 
seeking commercial surrogacy services are easy-to-find (albeit 
now illegal) in Canada.15  Further, the British Medical 
                                                                                                       
2007) reports that most people who enter surrogacy arrangements do 
not get legal assistance. In jurisdictions where there are prohibitions 
on commercial surrogacy, there is evidence of “do it yourself” 
arrangements:  COTS online:  <http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/About 
_COTS.htm>). A 2007 McLean’s Magazine story also evidences a 
DIY attitude in Canada.  See Jessica Webb, “Gay man seeks perfect 
woman: Surrogate mothers find a new niche market: single gay men” 
McLeans (May 21, 2007), online: Rogers Digital Media Publishing 
<http://www.fertilitylaw.ca/articles/macleans-01.pdf>. 
13  Usha Rengachary Smerdon, “Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: 
International Surrogacy Between the United States and India”, (2008) 
39 Cumb. L.Rev. 15. 
14  For example, in June 2009, People Magazine featured the story 
“Sarah Jessica Parker and Matthew Broderick have twins”, online: 
<http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20275425,00.html>.  The 
babies were born “with the generous help of a surrogate”.  The TV 
series “Lie to Me” repeated “Depraved Heart”, a story about women 
who killed herself after giving birth as a surrogate and the BBC aired 
the documentary “Addicted to Surrogacy”.   Susan Merkens and Tim 
Appleton argue that the media portrays surrogacy in a negative light, 
see Surrogate Motherhood and the Politics of Reproduction 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) and “Surrogacy” 
(2001) II Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology 256, 
respectively.  
15  See Tom Blackwell, “The impotency of Canada’s fertility laws” 
National Post (February 13, 2009), online: National Post: 
<http://www.nationalpost.com/m/story.html?id=128838> (accessed 
July 4, 2009).  See CBC, “Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in 
Canada”, online CBC <www.cbc.ca/health/story/2007/05/01/ 




Association recently changed its position on surrogacy 
arrangements.   In the mid-1980s it maintained that it was 
unethical for a doctor to be involved in surrogacy; by the late 
1990s, it accepted it as inevitable 16 
  
The next section of this paper briefly reviews 
surrogacy laws in Canada, the United States, and Britain.  
These three jurisdictions are the focus of this paper because 
commissioning parents in these countries are actively engaged 
in making surrogacy arrangements with surrogate mothers, 
either within their own countries or in other countries.  We then 
consider recent research on the characteristics and experiences 
of women who have agreed to be surrogates.  In this review, 
which is the main focus of the paper, empiricism will meet 
feminist theory as we revisit arguments against surrogacy, 
including the inability to give informed consent, the inherently 
exploitative nature of the arrangements and the dangers of 
commodification.  Anecdotal research, both popular and 
theoretical, is available, as is research based on more rigorous 
                                                                                                       
surrogates-pay.html>. See also Shireen Kashmeri, Unravelling 
Surrogacy in Ontario, Canada. An Ethnographic Inquiry on the 
Influence of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004), 
Surrogacy Contracts, Parentage Laws and Gay Fatherhood (M.A. 
Thesis, Concordia University Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology 2008) [unpublished] at 46.  Kashmeri looks at 
Canadian lawyers who were informants.   She confirms that 
Canadians are traveling to the United States to engage surrogate 
mothers and that American commissioning parents will make 
arrangements with Canadian surrogates to take advantage of the 
Canadian health care system and the lower cost of engaging surrogate 
mothers.  See also Mary Gazze, “Canada: Destination for Infertile 
Couples” Globe & Mail (June 26, 2007), A12.  
16  Olga B.A. van den Akker, “Psychosocial aspects of surrogate 
motherhood” (2007) 13 Human Reproduction Update 53 [van den 
Akker, “Psychosocial aspects”]. 
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empirical methodologies to study the experiences of surrogate 
mothers.  As will be described more fully, the “empirical data 
[consistently] offers little support for widely expressed 
concerns about contractual parenting being emotionally 
damaging or exploitative for surrogate mothers, children or 
intended/social parents”.17  Vasanti Jadva and her research 
team concluded, based on interviews with 34 British women 
who have been surrogate mothers, that  
 
Overall, surrogacy appears to be a positive 
experience for surrogate mothers.  Women who 
decide to embark on surrogacy often have 
completed a family of their own and feel that 
they wish to help a couple who would not 
otherwise be able to become parents.  The 
present study lends little support to the 
commonly held expectation that surrogate 
mothers will experience psychological problems 
following the birth of the child.  Instead, 
surrogate mothers often reported a feeling of 
self-worth.  In addition, surrogate mothers 
generally reported positive experiences with the 
commissioning couple, and many maintained 
contact with them and the child.18 
 
 A challenge to the federal Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (“AHRA”) (which prohibits paying a woman 
to be a surrogate mother) on federalism grounds was argued 
                                                     
17  Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, “Navigating Rough Waters: 
An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy” (2005) 61 
Journal of Social Issues 21. 
18  Vasanti Jadva, Clare Murray, Emma Lycett, Fiona MacCallum, & 
Susan Golombok, “Surrogacy: The Experience of Surrogate Mothers” 
(2003) 18 Human Reproduction 2196. 
 




before the Supreme Court of Canada in April, 2009 (the case 
started on reference by the Quebec government, before Quebec 
courts and they were joined by the governments of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick before the Supreme Court 
of Canada).    Both lower courts declared many sections of the 
AHRA unconstitutional.19  If the lower court decisions are 
upheld, the remaining sections of the AHRA will not make 
sense on their own and both the federal government and 
provincial governments will need to reconsider surrogacy and 
other assisted human reproduction laws.  Given this possibility, 
and in light of the research on surrogate mothers’ experiences, 
it is timely to review Canadian laws relating to surrogacy 
arrangements. We will briefly undertake such a review in the 
last section of the paper. 
 
In this paper we refer to agreements between surrogate 
mothers and commissioning parents as “surrogacy 
arrangements” unless the context requires otherwise.  This 
usage reflects the fact that it is unlikely that strict contract law 
principles would apply if the agreements unravelled.  Juliet 
Guichon asserts that, 
 
[t]he use of “contract” incorrectly implies that 
commercial law would govern in a disputed 
case, when in fact family law would apply. 
                                                     
19  Renvoi fait par le gouvernement du Québec en vertu de la Loi sur les 
renvois à la Cour d'appel, L.R.Q. ch. R-23, relativement à la 
constitutionnalité des articles 8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la Loi 
sur la procréation assistée, L.C. 2004, ch. 2 (Dans l'affaire du), 2008 
QCCA 1167, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 712.  The current challenge is on 
federalism grounds only.  It has been argued that aspects of the AHRA 
violate the Charter. See Dana Hnatiuk, “Proceeding with Insufficient 
Care: A Comment on the Susceptibility of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act to Challenge Under Section 7 of the Charter” 
(2007) 65 U.T. Fac. L.R. 39. 
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Moreover the word “contract” wrongly suggests 
that the deal can be enforced by law, even 
though no Canadian province has done so. 
Contract law is an essential tool of commerce 
and regards a deal as a deal.  It assumes that 
people are autonomous, rational, self-interested 
and equal. However, family law accepts that 
people are interdependent, capable of 
irrationality, self-giving and vulnerable.  Family 
law focuses on the body, emotions, and 
changing intentions; it ... places the needs of 




SURROGACY LAWS IN CANADA,  




The federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act was passed in 
2004 by the Canadian federal government after a 17 year 
public debate that included the RCNRT, eight different bills, 
and numerous Parliamentary and Senate hearings.21  It reflects 
the advice received from the RCNRT and early feminist 
thinking.  Section 6 creates various criminal offences, 
including the offence of paying or offering to pay a woman to 
                                                     
20  Juliet Guichon, “The body, emotions and intentions: challenges of 
preconception arrangements for health care providers” (2007) 176 
Canadian Medical Association Journal 479; see also Robert Leckey, 
“Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 Univ. of 
Toronto L.J. 1. 
21  See Jean Haase, “Canada: The Long Road to Regulation” in Eric 
Blyth and Ruth Landau, eds., Third Party Assisted Conception Across 
Cultures:  Social, Legal and Ethical Perspective (United Kingdom: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers Ltd, 2004) 55. 




be a surrogate mother. Section 12 provides that surrogates and 
others can be reimbursed for expenses as set out in regulations.  
However, s. 12 has not yet been proclaimed in force and 
therefore no regulations enabling surrogacy have been passed.22  
Section 12 (but not s. 6) is under challenge before the Supreme 
Court of Canada.  The intent of these provisions is to prohibit 
commercial, but not gratuitous, surrogacy. Anyone 
participating in a commercial surrogacy arrangement risks a 
                                                     
22  S.C. 2004 c. 2. The provisions are as follows: 
 6. (1) No person shall pay consideration to a female person to be a 
surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise that it 
will be paid.  
 (2) No person shall accept consideration for arranging for the services 
of a surrogate mother, offer to make such an arrangement for 
consideration or advertise the arranging of such services.  
 (3) No person shall pay consideration to another person to arrange for 
the services of a surrogate mother, offer to pay such consideration or 
advertise the payment of it. 
 (4) No person shall counsel or induce a female person to become a 
surrogate mother, or perform any medical procedure to assist a female 
person to become a surrogate mother, knowing or having reason to 
believe that the female person is under 21 years of age.  
 (5) This section does not affect the validity under provincial law of 
any agreement under which a person agrees to be a surrogate mother.  
 … 
 12. (1) No person shall, except in accordance with the regulations and 
a licence,  
 (a) reimburse a donor for an expenditure incurred in the course of 
donating sperm or an ovum; 
 (b) reimburse any person for an expenditure incurred in the 
maintenance or transport of an in vitro embryo; or 
 (c) reimburse a surrogate mother for an expenditure incurred by her in 
relation to her surrogacy. 
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fine of up to $500,000 or 10 years imprisonment.  As the 
federal government’s only jurisdiction for passing an assisted 
reproduction law is the criminal law power, the statute must in 
its intent and effect proscribe criminal behaviour by imposing 
penal sanctions (the RCNRT asserted that the “national 
concern” branch of the federal “peace, order and good 
government” power  provided the primary jurisdictional basis 
for federal regulation of new reproductive technologies, the 
federal government did not try to justify the AHRA on the basis 
of this doctrine before the Supreme Court of Canada23). The 
federal government does not have the jurisdiction to regulate 
activities which are simply undesirable.  According to Angela 
Cameron,  
 
as an overall policy goal, the [AHRA] seeks to 
prevent the commercialization or 
commodification of ‘life’.  This includes buying 
or selling any of the ‘raw ingredients’ for 
making a baby, babies themselves through 
gestational contracts. ... This goal is reflected 
throughout the Act by variously prohibiting and 
regulating activities such as surrogacy and the 
sale of sperm and eggs.24    
   
The AHRA defines a “surrogate mother” as a woman 
who carries a fetus conceived by assisted reproduction and 
                                                     
23   See RCNRT supra note 6 at 19-22. The “national concern” doctrine 
permits the federal government to assume jurisdiction if the subject 
matter has a “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly 
distinguishes it from a matter of provincial concern and a scale of 
impact on provincial jurisdiction that it compatible with the 
fundamental distribution of legislation power under the Constitution”: 
R. v. Crown Zellerbach [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 at 432.  
24  Angela Cameron, “Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act” (2008) 24 Can J. Fam. L. 101 at para. 11. 
 




derived from the genes of a donor or donors with the intention 
of surrendering the child at birth to the donor or another 
person. Therefore, it applies to both traditional surrogacy 
(where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother) and 
gestational surrogacy (where she is not).  While most surrogate 
mothers until the late-1980s would have been impregnated by 
assisted insemination and therefore are the genetic mothers of 
the children, by 1994, about 50 percent of surrogacies involved 
the implantation of an embryo created using the genetic 
materials of others.  This figure climbed to 95 percent by 
2003.25 Obviously, gestational surrogacy can only be achieved 
in a clinic setting and most Canadian clinics will require that 
the parties enter into some kind of an agreement before they 
will perform the procedure. 
 
While the AHRA came into force in 2004, the regime 
is, quite simply, not effective.  The board charged with 
preparing regulations that would give effect to most aspects of 
the licensing regime has not finalized any recommendations.  
Thus, regulations regarding matters such as reimbursement of 
surrogacy-related expenses and operating standards for fertility 
clinics (on matters such as the number of permissible IVF 
implants, participant screening, records maintenance, 
requirement for independent legal advice) have not been 
developed.  The statutorily-mandated date for a five year 
review of the AHRA has come and gone without any hint of the 
                                                     
25  Heléna Ragoné “Of Likeness and Difference: How Race is Being 
Transformed by Gestational Surrogacy” in Heléna Ragoné & France 
Winddance Twine, eds., Ideologies and Technologies of Motherhood: 
Race, Class, Nationalism  [New York: Routledge, 2000) [Ragoné, 
“Of Likeness and Difference”] and David P. Hamilton, “She’s 
Having Our Baby: Surrogacy is on the Rise as In Vitro Improves”  
The Wall Street Journal (4 February 2003),  online: The Wall Street 
Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1044305510652                 
776 944.html?mod=googlewsj>. 
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review.  This inaction together with the federalism challenge 
has created a situation where the law regulating reproductive 
technologies is uncertain, at best.  Surrogate mothers, 
commissioning parents, donors, and healthcare and other 
service providers who participate in making any assisted 
human reproduction arrangements are operating in the shadows 
of the law especially if any money changes hands.  It appears 
that no surrogacy-related charges have been laid under the 
AHRA.  However, Toronto lawyer Sherry Levitan, who has 
been working on surrogacy-related files since 1994, says that 
“trying to work within the current legislation is like walking 
through a fog”.26 
  
Provinces have jurisdiction over broad areas that are 
implicated by surrogacy arrangements including the regulation 
of professions, licensing of businesses, regulation of contracts 
and parenting issues including birth registration, adoption and 
custody and access (except in a divorce situation).  All 
provinces and territories have laws stating that custody and 
access decisions should be made using the “best interests of the 
child” test and they prohibit, in effect, buying children through 
adoption.27  As discussed in more detail below, only Quebec, 
Nova Scotia, Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador have 
statutes specifically concerning surrogacy arrangements.  
Courts in Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba have 
established precedents on birth registration.  In 1985, the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that 
commercial surrogacy contracts be statutorily regulated (before 
                                                     
26  See “Surrogacy in Canada,” online: Sherry Levitan <www.fertility 
law.ca/surrogacy.shtml>. 
27  See, for example, The [Manitoba] Adoption Act, C.C.S.M. c. A2, s. 3 
(the best interests test) and s. 120(1) prohibiting the 
commercialization of adoptions. 
 




the Baby M case changed the political landscape), but those 
recommendations were not followed.28   
  
Article 541 of the Quebec Civil Code (“Code”) 
provides that “any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to 
procreate or carry a child for another person is absolutely 
void.”29  In June 2009, An Act respecting clinical and research 
activities relating to assisted procreation was passed by the 
Quebec National Assembly (although it is not yet in force).30  
Under the new Act any assisted procreation activities, which 
include both assisted inseminations and embryo implants, must 
be carried out at a centre licensed under the act and in 
accordance with any regulations. The Act is silent on 
surrogacy.  In  X, sub. nom Adoption -091, a Quebec court was 
asked to permit a commissioning mother to adopt a child born 
in 2008 to a surrogate mother.  The line on the birth registration 
for the mother’s name had been left blank and the 
commissioning father was named as the father. The application 
was not opposed by the surrogate mother.  The commissioning 
parents had agreed to pay the surrogate mother $20,000 for  
“inconvenience and expenses” [trans]. The court held that in 
the face of the Code’s description of such agreements as 
“absolutely void” [trans] the commissioning mother could not 
be permitted to adopt the child. It stated that “the child does not 
have the right to a maternal affiliation at any price. To give 
effect to the father’s consent to the adoption of his child would 
                                                     
28  Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial 
Reproduction and Related Matters (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1985). 
29 Civil Code, 1991, c. 64, online at: <http://www2.publications 
duquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C
CQ/CCQ_A.html>.   
30  S.Q. 2009, C. 30, online at: http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/39 
legislature1/Projets-loi/Publics/09-a026-san.htm. 
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for the agency, in the circumstances, require wilful blindness 
and confirm that the ends justify the means” [trans]. 31 
 
Nova Scotia regulations provide that where a surrogacy 
arrangement was made prior to conception, the surrogate 
mother did not intend to parent the child and if one of the 
intended parents has a genetic link to the child, the birth 
registration can be amended on court order to remove the 
surrogate mother from the registration and to register the 
intended parents as the parents.32  The regulation does not 
expressly require the surrogate mother’s post-delivery consent 
to the order or even that she be given notice that an order is 
being sought.  Alberta legislation provides that if a child is a 
product of the donor’s genetic material and the “gestational 
carrier” consents, on application “the court shall make an order 
declaring the genetic donor to be the sole mother of the 
child”.33   The gestational carrier must, after the child’s birth, 
consent to the application.  Consent given prior to birth, as 
formalized in a gestational carrier agreement, may not be used 
as evidence of consent post-birth.  Newfoundland and Labrador 
surrogacy legislation34 provides that the registrar general can 
register the “intended parents” of a child “born through a 
surrogacy arrangement” if an adoption order or a declaratory 
order regarding parentage has been made by a court.  These 
orders may be sought before the child is born and the consent 
of the surrogate mother is not expressly required.  None of the 
legislative regimes in the common law provinces expressly 
                                                     
31   2009 QCCQ 628 para 77-78. 
32  [Nova Scotia] Birth Registration Regulation N.S. Reg. 390/2007. 
33  Family Law Act, S.A. 2003 c.F-4.5, s. 12. 
34  Vital Statistics Act, S.N.L. 2009, c. V-6.01, s. 5 read together with the 
Adoption Act, S.N.L. 1999, c.A-2.1, s. 25 and the Children’s Law Act, 
R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, s. 6. 
 




consider what happens if the surrogate mother does not consent 
to the order.   
 
Case law in British Columbia, coupled with a policy 
drafted by the Vital Statistics department, permits 
commissioning parents (even where they do not  have a genetic 
connection to the fetus) to apply prior to birth for an order 
regarding birth registration.35  The British Columbia Superior 
Court held in the B.A.N case (at paragraph 15) that it “… has 
the power in equity to grant the [pre-birth] declaration of 
parentage sought.  However, this power must be exercised in 
accordance with equitable principles, judicially and only where 
necessary.”  Courts in Ontario developed a “roadmap” for 
procedures to be used to issue post-birth orders, declaring 
commissioning parents to be the parents of a child born to a 
surrogate mother and for declaring that neither the surrogate 
mother nor her husband are the child’s parents.36   A Manitoba 
court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to order a pre-
birth parentage declaration in a surrogacy situation.37 
 
There is only one reported Canadian case, H.L.W. and 
T.H.W. v. J.C.T and J.T.,38 involving a custodial contest 
between a surrogate mother (and her husband) and 
commissioning parents.  In that case, a dispute arose shortly 
before birth over what expenses would be paid and, after the 
child was born, another dispute arose over what kind of 
                                                     
35  Rypkema v. British Columbia, 2003 BCSC 1784, [2003] B.C.J. No. 
2721 and B.A.N. v. J.H., 2008 BCSC 808, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 564. 
36  J.R. v. L.H. [2002[ O.J. #3998 (Ont. S.C.) and M.D. v. L.L. 2008 
CanLII 9374 (Ont.S.C.).  The roadmap reference is in para. 29 of the 
J.R. decision. 
37  J.C. v. Vital Statistics, 2000 MBQB 173. 
38  2005 BCSC 1679, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 680. 
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relationship the surrogate mother and her family would have 
with the child (note that this agreement was made before 
making payments to a surrogate mother was prohibited by the 
AHRA).  When these disputes continued unresolved, the 
surrogate mother and her husband sought custody of the child.  
The court held that the commissioning parents should retain 
custody pending trial and denied access to the surrogate 
mother.  No trial decision is reported. The other Canadian cases 
which focus on surrogacy arrangements involve birth 
registrations, parentage declarations, or access disputes 
between commissioning parents. 39 
   
The United States 
  
The American federal government has not passed laws related 
to the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements.  Elizabeth 
Scott found that in the immediate post-Baby M period, state 
law makers moved to prohibit or severely restrict surrogacy 
arrangements.  However, since 2000, surrogacy is seen as a 
service provided by surrogate mothers and regulators focus on 
the pragmatic objective of reducing procedural and substantive 
uncertainty about parental status. 40  She notes that this trend 
                                                     
39  See, for example, Rypkema and B.A.N, supra note 35; J.C. v. Vital 
Statistics, supra note 37 and M.D. v. L.L. supra note 36.  S.W.H. v. 
D.J.R., [2009] A.B.Q.B. 438 involves an access dispute over a six 
year old child who was conceived by a woman who agreed to act as a 
surrogate for the male plaintiff and his male partner.  The surrogate 
mother remained very involved in the girl’s life and conceived 
another child with the same man, whom she was raising with her 
female partner.  When the gay couple broke up, the genetic parents of 
the girl attempted, unsuccessfully, to deny the social father access to 
the girl. 
40  Elizabeth Scott, “Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification”, 
Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems [forthcoming].  For a 
more detailed comparative analysis of American state laws, see Judith 
F. Daar, Reproductive Technologies and the Law (Newark, New 
Jersey: LexisNexus Matthew Bender, 2006) and Pamela Laufer-




can be seen in statute law, bills introduced and reforms to the 
uniform law prototype, all which are increasingly supporting 
the enforcement of surrogacy contracts.41  For example, Florida 
and Utah42 have passed laws that specifically allow for 
commercial gestational surrogacy and deny any parental rights 
to surrogate mothers. Arkansas law provides for an 
unconditional presumption of validity of both gestational and 
traditional surrogacy contracts.43  Some states, such as 
Illinois,44 provide for pre-birth registration and require that 
birth certificates be issued in the name of genetic parents.  
Others, such as Texas and Nevada,45 will only enforce 
surrogacy contracts if the commissioning parents are 
heterosexual and married to each other, and therefore, restrict 
participation in such arrangements by married same-sex 
partners, common law partners, and single people.46  In 2009, 
Georgia became the first state to pass an embryo adoption law, 
albeit this act may be more about securing fetal rights as part of 
                                                                                                       
Ukeles, “Gestation: Work for Hire of the Essence of Motherhood? A 
Comparative Legal Analysis” (2003) 19 Duke J. Gender L. &  P’y 91.   
41  Scott, ibid. manuscript version at 16-17.  Daar, ibid at 473-477 makes 
the same observation. 
42  FLA.STAT. 742.11-15; FLA.STAT. 63.212 (2002); UTAH CODE 
ANN. 78-45g-801(3) (2005). 
43  ARK.CODE ANN.9-10-201 (2002). 
44 See Scott supra note 41, manuscript version at 18; 750 
ILL.COMP.STAT. 45/6 (2002). 
45 TEX.FAM.CODE 160.754; TEX FAM.CODE 160.762; NEV. 
REV.STAT.ANN. 126.045 (2001). 
46  See Judith Daar, “Accessing Reproductive Technologies:  Invisible 
Barriers, Indelible Harms” (2008) 23 Berk. J. Gender Law & Justice 
18.  
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a pro-life strategy than about securing early certainty regarding 
the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements.47  
 
According to Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, a number of state 
laws render surrogacy arrangements unenforceable and rely on 
the “best interests” test to determine custody and access.48  
However, she notes that these statutes were enacted before 
gestational surrogacy was a viable alternative and it is unclear 
whether the statutes apply to both traditional and gestational 
surrogacies.  Only a small number of jurisdictions, including 
Michigan, New York, and the District of Columbia,49 continue 
to prohibit surrogacy contracts using penal sanctions although, 
as in Canada, there do not appear to have been any 
prosecutions to date.   
 
 About 20 American states have not passed legislation 
dealing with surrogacy, so judge-made law remains 
determinative.50  Laufer-Ukeles provides an extensive review 
of many, if not all, reported surrogacy-related decisions of 
American courts.  She notes that American courts have 
consistently held that traditional surrogacy arrangements 
(where the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother) are 
either invalid and unenforceable or at least voidable and 
therefore, as in the Baby M case, rely on the “best interests of 
the child” test.  However, relying on arguments related to intent 
                                                     
47  Ga. Code Ann. 19-8-40 (2009).  See also David Becker, “Georgia 
Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Law” The Voice (4 April 
2009), online: The Voice Magazine <http://www.thevoicemagazine 
.com/georgia-passes-nation's-first-embryo-adoption-law-2009040452 
5.html> (accessed July 4, 2009). 
48   Laufer-Ukeles supra note 40 at 103.  
49   MCLS 722.851-861 (2002); NY Dom. Rel. 122 (2001); D.C. Code 
16-401, 402 (2002). 
50  This information is gleaned from a table provided by Daar, supra 
note 47 at 465-470. 




or genetics, they have also consistently held that gestational 
surrogacy arrangements (where the surrogate mother is not the 
genetic mother) are different.  Laufer-Ukeles also notes that 
“all U.S. courts ultimately favor the intended parents in 
gestational surrogate motherhood arrangements”.51 
 
 With one exception,52 the early American cases 
involving disputes between surrogate mothers and the 
commissioning parents were decided in the 1980s.  It appears 
that the commissioning parents were awarded custody in all of 
these cases, although in some cases, including Baby M, the 
surrogate mother was granted access.  Litigation in the last 20 
years concerning surrogacy is not between surrogate mothers 
and the commissioning parents; rather it arose either when the 
commissioning parents experienced difficulties registering the 
child as their own or where relationships fell apart and issues 
arose over parentage, custody, access and support. Given 
estimates that at least 1000 surrogacy arrangements are entered 






                                                     
51  Ibid. note 40 at 103. 
52  Anna J. v. Mark C. 286 Cal Rptr. 369 (Ct.App. 1991) aff’d sub nom. 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 
874 (1993) decided on appeal in 1993, is the only post-1980s case.  
Here, the court found in favour of a genetic mother and justified 
cutting off access to the surrogate mother by finding that the 
surrogacy contract (which had stated that all ties would be cut) ought 
to be enforced. For an analysis of this case, see Roxanne Mykitiuk, 
“Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in the 
Context of Assisted Human Reproduction Technologies” (2001) 39 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 771. 
53  Lee, supra note 12.  See also the other references in that note. 




The Surrogacy Arrangements Act (1985) together with the 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act (1990) prohibit 
commercial surrogacy arrangements and the use of for-profit 
agents but permit reimbursement for reasonable expenses to 
surrogate mothers.54  Intermediaries can be charged with 
criminal offences; sanctions for surrogate mothers and 
commissioning parents lie in the refusal to grant a parental 
order.  Most would-be surrogate mothers and commissioning 
parents do not use a lawyer to draft contracts.55  There are no 
media or other reports of criminal prosecutions against 
agencies since these two acts were passed.  
 
 While surrogacy contracts are not binding, it appears 
that there have only been a handful of cases (discussed below) 
related to post-delivery custodial arrangements. Surrogate 
mothers (irrespective of whether they have a genetic 
connection to the child) must be named on the birth certificate.   
Genetic fathers may be named on the birth certificate or they 
can enter into parental responsibility agreements with the 
surrogate mother upon the birth of the child.  Six weeks after 
the birth, married genetic commissioning parents, with the 
consent of the surrogate mother, can apply for a “parental 
order” which, once granted, will give them full, permanent and 
exclusive parental rights.56  Single people, common law 
heterosexual couples, and same sex couples who participate in 
                                                     
54  1985, c. 49 and 1990, c. 37.  See Myriam Hunter-Henin, “Surrogacy: 
Is there Room for a New Liberty Between the French Prohibitive 
Position and the English Ambivalence?” (2008) II Law and Bioethics 
329. 
55 “Solicitors”, Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy, online: 
COTS <http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/SolicitorsMap.htm>. 
56 Adoption and Children’s Act (U.K.), 2002, c.38 (formerly the 
Children’s Act (U.K.), 1989, c. 41). 




surrogacy arrangements as commissioning parents must apply 
for an adoption order. 
 
 Britain had one very high profile case, in 1985, where 
a child welfare agency apprehended a child upon hearing that 
Kim Cotton, her surrogate mother, who had been paid £6500, 
was about to surrender her to the commissioning parents.  
Seven days later a court held that the baby should go to the 
commissioning parents.  While there was no dispute between 
the participants to the arrangements, the Baby Cotton case 
generated significant public controversy over baby-selling and 
resulted in quick passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act.   
Cotton went on to found the largest British agency that 
matched potential surrogate mothers and commissioning 
parents.57   
 
 There are three reported English cases58 involving 
disputes between surrogate mothers and the commissioning 
parents. In the two earlier cases, custody was awarded to the 
parent who had had custody of the children since birth. In one 
case this was the surrogate mother and in the other it was the 
commissioning parents. In the 2008 case, the surrogate mother 
had twice deceived the commissioning parents, telling them 
that she had miscarried when, in fact, she gave birth to the 
children and was raising them together with her husband.  On 
an interim basis, the two children were made wards of the 
court, with the six year old staying with the surrogate mother 
and her husband and the 18 month old moving into the home of 
the commissioning parents. No final decision has been 
                                                     
57  For the surrogate mother’s account, see Kim Cotton & Denise Winn, 
Baby Cotton: for love and money (London: Dorling Kindersley, 
1985). 
58  Re: P (Minors) (Wardship:Surrogacy), [1987] 2 FLR 421; Re: MW 
(Adoption:Surrogacy), [1995] 2 FLR 759; Re:  P (Surrogacy: 
Residence), [2008] 1 FLR 177. 
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reported.  All other reported decisions relating to surrogacy 
addressed legal parentage or payment issues. 
  
COMPARISON AND SUMMARY OF CANADIAN, 
AMERICAN, AND BRITISH SURROGACY LAWS 
 
Canada, many American states, and Britain take different legal 
approaches to surrogacy arrangements and issues relating to 
parentage.  Canada prohibits any payments (including, in the 
absence of regulations, even expenses) to a surrogate mother or 
third parties and expensive, sometimes prolonged judicial 
proceedings are required in most provinces after the birth of the 
child to finalize parentage. American states have various laws, 
but only a few place criminal sanctions on payments of both 
expenses and fees to surrogate mothers.  The trend is toward 
expedited pre-birth determination of parentage by civil servants 
especially for heterosexual married couples.  Britain permits 
payment of reasonable expenses (but not fees) to surrogate 
mothers and has an expedited post-birth parentage-registration 
regime for married couples that still require judicial 
involvement. Unmarried people must apply for an adoption 
order.  What is common between the three countries is that it 
appears no prosecutions for fee payments (even though such 
payments are made in Canada and Britain) or exploitative 
behaviour.  Further, there has been almost no litigation in any 
of these countries in the last two decades between surrogate 
mothers and commissioning parents on any issues related to the 
surrogacy arrangements, such as conduct during pregnancy or 
parentage, custody, or access regarding the child after birth.  
This observation could indicate relative satisfaction with the 
arrangements or an inability to contest them for financial 
reasons, fear of repercussions, or recognition that the 









FEMINIST THEORY MEETS EMPIRICISM 
 
Three inter-related rationales are given for prohibiting 
commercial surrogacy arrangements:  a surrogate mother 
cannot give meaningful consent prior to delivery and therefore 
the contracts could be unconscionable; the potential for 
exploitation of surrogate mothers is so significant that the 
contracts must be unenforceable and discouraged; and, the 
payment of money for reproductive services commodifies 
women and children and is, therefore, contrary to human 
dignity. The RCNRT was deeply influenced by all three of 
these arguments. 
 
In this part of the paper, the factual underpinnings of 
the RCNRT’s theoretical concerns will be tested against the 
empirical research by academic researchers on the experiences 
of surrogate mothers and other aspects of surrogate 
arrangements conducted in the last two decades.  Anecdotal 
and popular accounts are also referenced but they are not relied 
upon to support conclusions unless a more rigorous 
methodology also supports the conclusion.  Many of the nearly 
40 empirical studies we reviewed in this paper are interview-
based qualitative studies involving surrogate mothers and, 
therefore, the voices of those most directly impacted can be 
heard. Other methodologies, such as standard form 
psychological testing and clinical or agency file reviews, are 
also used. All of the empirical studies cited in this paper are 
peer-reviewed and all but one59 are published in academic 
journals or by academic presses. To give some context for each 
study reviewed, the date, jurisdiction, methodology, and 
sample size is noted in the text of this paper. However, it is 
                                                     
59  The exception is Kashmeri, supra note 15 is a thesis written for a 
Masters of Arts (Anthropology) and it has not (yet) been published by 
an academic publisher. 
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well beyond the scope of this paper to review and critique the 
methodologies used in each study or to suggest research gaps. 
Readers interested in that information may find Ciccarelli and 
Beckman’s research useful as it provides more technical 
information on 27 empirical studies published between 1983 
and 2003, including a dense four page table, that sets 
jurisdiction, sample size, data collection methods, variables, 
and limitations.60   
  
Most of the research considered in this paper was 
conducted in the United States or Britain.  Shireen Kashmeri’s 
2004 ethnographic study is the only Canadian empirical study 
on participants’ experiences.61 The only other Canadian 
empirical studies relating to surrogacy focus on public attitudes 
towards surrogacy arrangements, referred to earlier.62  
Kashmeri notes that it was difficult to find Canadian surrogate 
mothers who were willing to speak on the record, although she 
has, with their permission, been able to carry on dialogue 
within on-line communities, also known as computer-
mediated-communication.  One surrogate mother who agreed 
to be interviewed in-person for Kashmeri’s study stated that 
 
Canadian surrogates don’t want to talk because 
they are being paid.  If they talk, there’ll be a 
record of them somewhere and they’re afraid 
that it’ll get back to the couple that’s paying 
them.  Because they could end up in prison.  
Most of them have signed a contract saying that 
they won’t talk to anyone. I remember when a 
couple tried to throw that into my contract and I 
                                                     
60  Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17 at 25-28. 
61  Kashmeri, supra note 15.   
62  Krishnan, supra note 11 and Genuis, supra note 11. 




was pretty quick with that – you ain’t going to 
gag me.63 
 
However, as American and British legal regimes and the social 
and economic status of women in these two countries are 
comparable to legal regimes and the status of women in 
Canada, it is probably safe to extrapolate these results to 
Canada. 
 
Social, Racial, and Psychological Characteristics of 
Surrogate Mothers 
 
Rakhi Ruparelia argued “the existence of power hierarchies, 
even subtle ones, and the obligations that arise from close-knit 
family structures, make it difficult for women to refuse a 
request to be a gift surrogate”.64  Many feminists, including 
Overall, Diana Majury, and Mary Lyndon Shanley, have 
suggested that payment for commercial surrogacy will take 
advantage of economic, physical, and emotional vulnerabilities 
of women and they note the potential for exploitation of poor, 
young, single, ethnic minority women.65   Anita Allen asserted 
that “minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as 
“mother machines” for embryos of middle and upper-class 
clients.  It’s a new, virulent, form of racial and class 
discrimination. Within a decade, thousands of poor and 
minority women will likely be used as a “breeder class”.66  
Gena Corea described the arrangements as creating a “female 
                                                     
63  Kashmeri, supra note 15 at 18. 
64  Rakhi Ruparelia, “Giving Away the ‘Gift of Life”: Surrogacy and the 
Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2007) 23 Can. J. Fam. 
L. 11 at para. 43. 
65  Overall, “Human Reproduction;” Overall, “A Feminist Analysis;”  
Majury and Shanley, supra note 6. 
66  Allen, supra note 6 (at page 7 of the on-line version). 
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breeding caste”67 and Barbara Katz Rothman predicted that 
gestational surrogacy would lead to a situation in which  
 
[p]oor, uneducated third world women and 
women of color from the United States and 
elsewhere, with fewer economic alternatives, 
can be hired more cheaply.  They can also be 
controlled more tightly. With a legally supported 
surrogate motherhood contract and with the new 
[IVF] technology the marketing possibilities are 
endless–and terrifying. Just as Perdue and Holly 
Farms advertise their chickens based on superior 
breeding and feeding, the baby brokers could 
begin to advertise their babies: brand-name, 
state-of-the art babies produced from the 
“finest” of genetic materials and an all-natural, 
vitamin-enriched diet.68 
 
However, studies on surrogate mothers consistently show that 
most women who agree to become either gratuitous or 
commercial surrogates are Caucasian, Christian, and in their 
late 20-early 30s.69  Surrogate mothers have varying degrees of 
                                                     
67  Gena Corea, “Testimony before the California Judiciary Committee,” 
April 5, 1988, cited in Larry Gostin, ed., Surrogate Motherhood: 
Politics and Privacy (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988) 
325. 
68   Supra note 6 at 237. 
69  See, for example, Janice C. Ciccarelli, The surrogate mother: A post-
birth follow-up (Ph.D. Dissertation, California School of Professional 
Psychology 1997 [The Surrogate Mother]; Hazel Basilington, “The 
Social Organization of Surrogacy:  Relinquishing a Baby and the 
Role of Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process” (2002) 7 
Journal of Health Psychology 57;  I. Schmulker & Betsy Aigen, “The 
terror of surrogate motherhood: Fantasies, realities and viable 
legislation” in J. Offerman-Zuckerberg, ed., Gender in Transition: A 
New Frontier (New York; Plenum, 1989) 235; Jadva et al. supra note 




education.  For example, 11of 17 American surrogate mothers 
in Melinda Hohman and Christine Hagan’s 2001 study had 
some college education.  Of the 50 American surrogate 
mothers in Joan Einwohner’s 1989 study, most had completed 
high school, many had gone on to college, a few had graduate 
degrees and one had three masters degrees.  Eric Blyth’s 1993 
study of British surrogate mothers shows lower education rates 
for these women than the American studies: 14 out of the 19 
women interviewed had left school before the age of 17. 
  
Beckman and Ciccarelli conclude from their review of 
American empirical studies that “surrogate mothers’ family 
incomes are most often modest (as opposed to low) and they 
are from working class backgrounds”.70  Based on a subjective 
assessment of the material standards within their homes, Blyth 
determined that three of the 19 British surrogate mothers 
interviewed for his study lived in “financially straitened 
circumstances”.71 One woman in his study said that most 
                                                                                                       
19: Joan Einwohner, “Who becomes a surrogate: Personality 
Characteristics” in J. Offerman-Zuckerberg, supra this note, 123); 
Christine Kleinpeter & Melinda Hohman, “Surrogate motherhood: 
personality traits and satisfaction with service providers” (2000) 87 
Psychological Reports 135; Melinda Hohman & Christine Hagan, 
“Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational Model” (2001) 
4 Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 61; Heléna 
Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception at the Heart (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1994) [Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood]; Olga 
van den Akker, “A longitudinal pre-pregnancy to post-delivery 
comparison of genetic and gestational surrogate and intended 
mothers: Confidence and genealogy” (2005) 26 Journal of 
Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynecology 277 [van den Akker, 
“Longitudinal comparison”]. 
70  Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17 at 31 come to this conclusion 
based on a review of the empirical studies. 
71  Eric Blyth, “I wanted to be interesting. I wanted to be able to say 
‘I’ve done something interesting with my life:’” Interviews with 
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surrogate mothers she knew were in receipt of income support. 
However, as Blyth interviewed 50 percent of the known 
surrogate mothers in Britain at that time (1993) and none were 
in receipt of assistance, this report seems unlikely.  No other 
study has reported that women in receipt of income assistance 
had become surrogate mothers and many agencies connecting 
would-be surrogate mothers with commissioning parents will 
not take women on assistance.  Importantly, no empirical study 
reviewed for this paper indicates that any surrogate mothers 
became involved with surrogacy because they were 
experiencing financial distress.  
  
Almost all commissioning parents were married; 
surrogate mothers, however, were less likely to be married or 
partnered. Timothy Appleton reports, for example, that only 68 
percent of the 140 surrogate mothers in his study were married 
or partnered.72  Not surprisingly, given the high costs of 
surrogacy and the fact that they do not usually have children 
yet, the commissioning parents were older, more educated and 
had higher incomes than the surrogate mothers and their 
partners.73  Olga van den Akker states that “no negative effects 
of this socioeconomic inequity have been reported”.74 
                                                                                                       
surrogate mothers in Britain” (1994) 12 Journal of Reproductive and 
Infant Psychology 189 [Blyth, “Interesting”]. 
72  Timothy Appleton, “Emotional Aspects of Surrogacy: A Case for 
Effective Counselling and Support” in Rachel Cook, Shelley Day 
Sclater, & Felicity Kaganas, eds., Surrogate Motherhood: 
International Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 199 
[Appleton, “Emotional Aspects]. 
73  See, for example, Jadva et al., supra note 18 (note that the 
commissioning parents paired with the  surrogate women who were 
interviewed for this study were themselves interviewed in Fiona 
MacCallum, Emma Lycett, Clare Murray, Vasanti Jadva, Susan 
Golombok, “Surrogacy:  The experiences of commissioning couples” 
(2003) 18 Human Reproduction 1334); van den Akker, 
“Psychological trait and state characteristics, social support and 




 Janice Ciccarelli and Linda Beckman, after surveying 
the empirical literature, conclude that “women of color are 
greatly under-represented as surrogate mothers”.75  With one 
exception, all surrogate mothers in the reported cases are white 
and in the one case where a self-described, half-Black woman 
was the surrogate mother, the commissioning mother was 
described as “Philippina”.76   The only exception is Heléna 
Ragoné.  She notes  that all participants in her 1994 study were 
Euro-American, but that this figure changed for her 2000 study 
on gestational surrogacy.  Thirty percent of the surrogate 
mothers and commissioning parents in the later study were not 
from the same racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds.77  
However, she suggests that it is just as likely for a Euro-
American woman to carry a child for a non-Euro-American 
couple as for the reverse to occur.  She heard that some 
participants prefer not to be matched with someone who shares 
                                                                                                       
attitudes to the surrogate pregnancy and baby” (2007) 22 Human 
Reproduction 2287 [van den Akker, “Psychological trait”]; van den 
Akker, “Longitudinal comparison,” supra note 70;  Basilington, 
supra note 70; Timothy Appleton, “Emotional Aspects” ibid.; Eric 
Blyth, “‘Not a primrose path’: Commissioning parents’ experiences 
of surrogacy arrangements in Britain” (1995) 13 Journal of 
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 185 [Blyth, “Primrose”] and 
Christine Kleinpeter, Tamara Lee Boyer & Mary Ellen Kinney, 
“Parents’ Evaluation of a California-Based Surrogacy Program” 
(2006) 13 J.of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 1. 
74  van den Akker, “Psychosocial aspects”, supra note 16 at 57. 
75  Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17 at 31.  They also provide a table 
setting out the characteristics of surrogate mothers who were studied 
and note when this information is available, the surrogate mother’s 
ethnicity.  The participants are almost always described as white or 
Caucasian.   
76  Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 52. 
77  Ragoné, “Of Likeness and Difference”, supra note 25. 
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their race or ethnicity because they believe that it would be less 
likely that the surrogate mother will feel a strong connection to 
a child who is different from her.  As one surrogate mother 
said, “I haven’t [thought of the child as mine], because she is 
not mine, she never has been.  For one thing, she is totally 
Japanese.  It was a little hard for me.  In a way she will always 
be my Japanese girl, but she is theirs”.78 
  
Some researchers have used standardized 
psychological tests to assess surrogate mothers.  They have 
concluded that surrogate mothers are within normal ranges on 
these tests.79  Surrogate mothers are more likely than the 
general population to be self-sufficient, independent thinkers, 
and nonconformists and, therefore, they are less affected by 
social proscriptions and sanctions than other women.80  
Christine Kleinpeter and Melissa Hohman found that the 17 
American surrogate mothers in their study scored much higher 
on the extroversion factor than other women.81  This factor 
indicates a person who is sociable, assertive, active, energetic, 
and optimistic.  On the basis of these psychological tests, 
Einwohner concludes that surrogate mothers are intelligent, 
                                                     
78  Ibid. at 66. 
79  See Einwohner, supra note 69;  Andrea Mechanick Braverman & 
Stephen Corson, “Characteristics of participants in a gestational 
carrier program”  (1992) 9  Journal of Assisted Reproduction and 
Genetics 353; Darrell Franks, “Psychiatric Evaluation of women in a 
surrogate mother program”  (1981) 138 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 1378; van den Akker, “Genetic and gestational surrogate 
mothers' experience of surrogacy” (2003) 21:2 Journal of 
Reproductive and Infant Psychology 145 [van den Akker, 
“Experience of surrogacy”]; Jadva et al., supra note 18;  Kleinpeter & 
Hohman, supra note 69; and Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69.  For a 
summary of these studies see Teman, supra note 12. 
80  Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69 at 80-81. 
81  Kleinpeter & Hohman, supra note 69 at 957. 




self-aware, stable adults who are down to earth, practical, and 
decent people who are optimistic and not worriers.82    
  
Ragoné notes that screening and selection procedures 
in the United States are stringent because surrogacy is 
commercial and subject to more professional regulation.83  
However, a 1999 British study on organizational selection and 
assessment of the psychological health of potential surrogate 
mothers found that “psychosocial assessment was minimally 
addressed by all organizations and no fixed procedures for 
assessment and selection were employed”.84 Since that report, 
others British studies have recommended screening protocols 
for both surrogate mothers and commissioning parents.85 
  
Many theorists have stated that a potential surrogate 
cannot make a rational choice when she signs the contract, 
because the emotional volatility of pregnancy and the 
instability of woman’s embodiment may cause her to change 
her mind during pregnancy.86  The RCNRT concluded that the 
                                                     
82  Einwohner, supra note 69 at 126. 
83  Ragoné, supra notes 25 & 69.   
84  Olga van den Akker, “Organizational selection and assessment of 
women entering a surrogacy agreement in the UK” (1999) 14 Human 
Reproduction 262 [van den Akker, “Organizational selection”]. 
85  For example, see Peter Brinsden, Tim C. Appleton, Elizabeth Murray, 
Mohammed Hussein, Fidelis Akagbosu, & Samuel Marcus, 
“Treatment by in vitro fertilization with surrogacy: experience of one 
British centre” (2000) 320 BMJ 924; Judy Parkinson, Cuong Tran, 
Tih Tan, Jeffrey Nelson, Joel Batzofin, & Paulo Serafini, “Perinatal 
outcome after in-vitro fertilization-surrogacy” (1999) 14 Human 
Reproduction 671; Timothy Appleton, “Surrogacy” (2002) ESHRE 
Monographs: Guidelines for Counselling in Infertility 37 and Peter 
Brinsden, “Clinical Aspects of IVF Surrogacy in Britian” in Cook et 
al., supra note 72. 
86  See Shalev, supra note 9 for a literature review. 
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physical and hormonal changes of pregnancy may “affect her 
thoughts and feelings about what she is doing and the foetus 
she is carrying, [and] these effects cannot be predicted 
precisely before pregnancy begins”.87  Almost all surrogate 
mothers in every study reviewed had already had children and 
had completed their families.88  Clinics and agencies report that 
they will only agree to work with women who have given birth 
because this status increases the chances of a successful 
pregnancy and delivery and means that the women have a more 
realistic perception of what it would mean for them to 
surrender a child.89   
 
A study by Judith Parkinson et al. of 98 British 
surrogate mothers involved a review of their medical files and 
interviews with them, commissioning parents, and doctors after 
the child’s birth.  All surrogate mothers had already given birth 
to two or three children before entering surrogacy 
arrangements.  This study concluded that the surrogate mothers 
had “a confident psychological framework regarding 
pregnancy and birth”.90  In one of the few longitudinal studies 
on surrogacy arrangements, van den Akker interviewed 22 
British surrogate mothers before conception and then again six 
months post-delivery.  She concluded that  
 
[s]urrogate mothers were highly confident from 
the start about the surrogacy process and about 
                                                     
87  RCNRT, supra note 5 at 675. 
88  Jadva et al,. supra note 18; Blyth, “Interesting” supra note 71; R. J. 
Edelmann, “Surrogacy: the psychological issues” (2004) 22 12  
Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 123. 
89  See, for example, Parkinson et al., Brinsden & Brinsden et al., supra 
note 85.  
90  Parkinson et al., ibid. 
 




the health and well-being of the surrogate baby 
... many knew that they could do this 
emotionally, and were convinced that they 
would succeed, demonstrating self-efficacy at 
the start (when one would have expected them to 
have some doubts), and six months post 
relinquishment.91 
 
 As will be discussed, most surrogate mothers reported 
good relationships with commissioning parents and that they 
had few difficulties, if any, with relinquishing the child. Most 
women interviewed by researchers had been a surrogate mother 
only once, although many said that they would do it again.92  
For example, of the 19 women interviewed for Blyth’s study 
only five women said that they would not do it again.  Of these 
five, age was a factor for one; two had already done it twice 
(and that was enough) and two reported that they regretted the 
decision to become involved in surrogacy and would not do it 
again.  In most studies only a small number of women had been 
a surrogate twice and no one had entered more than two such 
arrangements. The number of women who had been surrogate 
mothers more than once was somewhat higher in the Blyth 
study and in Hazel Basilington’s study of British surrogate 
mothers, where six of 19 and three of the 14 women, 
respectively, were pregnant as a surrogate mother for a second 
time. One woman in each study was expecting her third child 
conceived in this way.  
  
One consistent finding in the empirical research is that 
the idea of becoming a surrogate mother started with the 
                                                     
91  van den Akker, “Longitudinal comparison”, supra note 69. 
92  See, for example, Ciccarelli & Beckman, Hohman & Hagan, 
Kleinpeter & Hohman, and Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, supra 
note 69. 
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women themselves;93 there was no evidence in any study 
indicating that women were being pressured or coerced into 
becoming surrogate mothers.  After one literature review, 
Christine Kerian concluded that “women’s motivations for 
becoming surrogates are legitimate and thoroughly thought 
out”.94 An interview-based study of 17 American women 
concluded that “far from being ‘used’ or exploited as has been 
suggested, the participants in this study appeared to be very 
clear that this is what they wanted to do, often despite negative 
responses from those around them”.95  
  
 None of the American studies and only a few of the 
British studies comment on the relationship between the 
surrogate mothers and the commissioning parents prior to their 
discussions concerning surrogacy.  Where this factor is noted, 
one study found that all or almost all parties were strangers to 
each other, but others have noted that between 20 percent and 
50 percent of the surrogate mothers were friends or family 
members of the commissioning parents.96  None of these 
studies give support to the theory that women are being 
coerced by family members to participate in either gratuitous or 
commercial surrogacy arrangements.   
  
                                                     
93  See, for example, Blyth, “Interesting” supra note 71 at 192. 
94  Christine Kerian, “Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile 
Women or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?” 
(1997) 12 Wis. Women’s L. J. 113 at 157. 
95  Hohman & Hogan, supra note 69 at 80-81. 
96  Blyth, “Primrose”, supra  note 73; Parkinson et al., supra note 85 
identified 20 percent of surrogates as family or friends; Appleton, 
“Emotional,” supra note 72 identified almost 50 percent as family 
and friends; MacCallum et al., supra note 73 identified 69 percent as 
strangers; 17 percent as family and 14 percent as friends and Brinsden 
et al. supra note 86 identified 37 percent as family or friends. 
 




Rakhi Ruparelia97 argues that some women living in 
western countries who are members of some sub-cultures (such 
as those with South Asian roots) may not have a real choice but 
to agree to be a surrogate for a family member.  This concern is 
heightened where women are financially dependent on their 
families, live with cultural norms that demand passivity and 
self-sacrifice, and are subject to powerful patriarchal norms.  
Ruparelia’s analysis relies on anecdotes and most of the stories 
concern participants living in India.  However, the empirical 
research on surrogate mothers in Britain and the United States 
(which, like Canada, have significant newcomer populations 
and established South Asian sub-cultures) indicates that few 
racial minority women are involved in surrogacy in the two 
countries and, in studies were ethnicity is identified, none of 
the surrogate mothers are identified as South Asian.  No 
empirical study has suggested that any women in these two 
countries are being coerced by others into becoming surrogates, 
or even doing it at the suggestion of others.  Rather, the 
research shows that the impetus to become a surrogate most 
frequently comes from the woman herself. We must 
acknowledge, however, that we are not aware of any empirical 
study that focuses specifically on the experiences of surrogate 
mothers who are also members of particular ethnic or racial 
sub-cultures within western countries.  Further, as will be 
discussed, anecdotal research is emerging which shows that 
women in some countries, particularly in India, are being 
exploited by surrogacy contracts. 
   
The profile of surrogate mothers emerging from the 
empirical research in the United States and Britain does not 
support the stereotype of poor, single, young, ethnic minority 
women whose family, financial difficulties, or other 
circumstances pressure her into a surrogacy arrangement.   Nor 
                                                     
97  Ruparelia, supra note 64. 
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does it support the view that surrogate mothers are naively 
taking on a task unaware of the emotional and physical risks it 
might entail.  Rather, the empirical research establishes that 
surrogate mothers are mature, experienced, stable, self-aware, 
and extroverted non-conformists who make the initial decision 
that surrogacy is something that they want to do. 
 
Financial Motivation to be Surrogate Mothers  
  
Many express concern that women with few other choices will 
become surrogates out of economic need.  Janice Raymond 
describes surrogacy as a form of violence against women and 
states that a surrogate mother might “consent” to the 
arrangement, but “she has little self-determination if she cannot 
find sustaining and dignified work and resorts to surrogacy as a 
final economic resort”.98 As noted earlier, Overall described 
surrogacy as “reproductive prostitution” and Martha Field 
feared that a “breeder class” would emerge, and Lyndon 
Shanley called it “consensual slavery”.  Allen asserted that 
 
[t]olerating practices that convert women’s 
wombs and children into valuable market 
commodities threatens to deny them respect as 
equals.  Commercial surrogacy encourages 
society to think of economically and socially 
vulnerable women as at its disposal for a price.  
Segments of the public will draw the obvious 
parallels to slavery and prostitution99 
 
For others, as evidenced by the massive public outcry in Britain 
against the surrogate mother’s acceptance of money in the 
                                                     
98  Supra note 6 at xix-xx and 103.  See also Allen supra note 6 at 7 (of 
the online version). 
99  Allen ibid. 
 




Baby Cotton case, the fear is the surrogate mother’s greed. The 
Waller Committee in Australia stated that “whatever terms are 
employed ... [surrogacy] is the buying and selling of a baby ... 
The buying and selling of children has been condemned and 
proscribed for generations”.100 Rothman stated that “the baby 
has become a commodity, something a woman can produce 
and sell”101 and she fears that “if we allowed babies to be sold, 
some people would be under great pressure to sell their 
babies”.102 
   
Elly Teman notes in her research survey that “nearly 
every study of surrogates’ motivations attempts to determine 
sufficient financial distress in the surrogate’s life that might 
provide a reason for her need to turn to this desperate 
measure.”103   She goes on to observe that almost every study 
ends up concluding that money was rarely the sole and 
infrequently even the primary reason for entering the 
arrangement.  Ciccarelli reports that “contrary to popular 
beliefs about money as the prime motive, surrogate mothers 
overwhelmingly report that they choose to bear children for 
others primarily out of altruistic concerns. Although financial 
reasons may be present, only a handful of women mentioned 
money as their main motivator”.104  As already noted, none of 
the studies reveal any women agreeing to become surrogate 
mothers because they were experiencing financial distress.  
  
                                                     
100  Australia, Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues 
Arising from In Vitro Fertilization, Report on the Disposition of 
embryos provided by in vitro fertilization (Melbourne: State of 
Victoria, 1984) at 52. 
101  Barbara Katz Rothman, “On Surrogacy: Constructing Social Policy” 
in J. Offerman-Zuckerberg, supra note 69, 227 at 229. 
102  Rothman, supra note 6 at 234. 
103  Elly Teman, supra note 12 at 1107. 
104   Ciccarelli, supra note 70 at 30. 
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Many studies reveal that those women who indicated 
that money was one motivating factor also said that “it was a 
reasonably convenient way of combining the responsibility of 
looking after young children with the wish or need to earn 
money”.105  Blyth notes that there was, 
 
... virtually unanimity [among the 19 participants 
of his study] that it was unrealistic to expect 
surrogate mothers to carry a pregnancy and hand 
over a baby (or babies) to the commissioning 
parents without reimbursement of expenses at 
least, in recognition of their time (e.g. loss of 
earnings), inconvenience, discomfort and the 
risks to which they were exposed, and the 
additional costs incurred.106 
 
 Financial motivations were more strongly expressed in 
two early studies than in later studies.  The 1989 Einwohner 
study of 50 American surrogate mothers found that 40 percent 
of them said that money was the main (but not sole) 
motivator.107  Basilington’s research was based on in-depth 
interviews conducted in 1992-93 with 19 British women who 
were members of a surrogate mothers’ self-help group. 
Members encouraged each other to view the surrogacy 
arrangement as a job incorporating payment. As one woman 
said in answer to the question “what do you think about the 
association of surrogacy with money”?  
 
If you’re being paid for your time, it’s like a 
contract and it severs it completely at the end 
because it is a job done and you’re paid for it 
                                                     
105  See, for example, Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69. 
106  Blyth, “Interesting” supra  note 71  at 192. 
107  Einwohner, supra note 69. 
 




and that’s the end of it. And so if you think like 
that, I think it’s, it balances everything up and 
it’s like a goal to go towards if you see it.108 
 
In light of this group encouragement, it is not surprising that 11 
of the 19 women in this study said that money was a motivator 
and that for four women, payment was the sole reason.109  
However, several women also reported that they were surprised 
to find, after joining the group, that they might be reimbursed, 
as they had not originally had any expectation of payment.   
 
 There is no empirical research supporting the assertion 
that women are becoming surrogate mothers because they are 
facing financial distress.  Most women report that money is 
rarely the sole or even the prime motive for participating.  It is 
hardly surprising that many women who are surrogates believe 
that they should be reimbursed for their expertise, time, 
inconvenience, and discomfort.  Surrogates like other service 
providers, such as health care workers, firefighters, and foster 
parents, are engaged in pursuits that involve physical risk and 
discomfort, significant emotional involvement and continued 
engagement (such as being “on call”).  They often have 
altruistic motives for doing what they do and yet they still 
expect to be paid even if every hour is not accounted for.  
 
Non-pecuniary Motivations for Surrogacy  
  
The desire to help a childless couple was the prime motive 
given for agreeing to be a surrogate mother.  For example, 
Jadva et al. report that 91 percent of the women in their study 
                                                     
108  Basilington, supra note 69 at 64. 
109  Ibid. at 63.  Note:  while this study was not published until 2002, the 
data was collected in 1992-3. 
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reported this as their prime motivation.110  One surrogate 
mother in Kashmeri’s study stated that 
 
 DH [dear husband] and I have completed our 
family but I was disappointed at never having 
the opportunity to be pregnant again.  At the 
same time, I was becoming increasingly 
disillusioned with, what I feel are, the social 
injustices of gay rights. Yes, gay celebrities are 
able to adopt but for the average joe/josephine, 
most states have slammed the door on gay 
parental rights. With surrogacy, I can help create 
a family for a person who otherwise would have 
no way of fulfilling their dream or parenthood, 
AND experience pregnancy again for myself ... 
well, I only needed to know where to sign up!111 
 
 Some researchers noted that several donors saw their 
donative acts not so much as altruistic gifts but as projects of 
the self.  Rhonda Shaw, who interviewed 14 New Zealander 
women, observed that, 
 
[t]he reasons donors give for donating gametes 
or reproductive services are pro-social in 
orientation.  Although gift language was not 
always foregrounded in the narratives of the 
women I interviewed, many of my interviewees 
saw their donations as symbolizing acts of 
human connection and solidarity in accordance 
                                                     
110  Jadva et al., supra note 18.  See also, for example, Mechanick 
Braverman & Corson, supra note 79; Edelmann, supra note 89; 
Blyth, “Interesting” supra note 71; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69; 
Heléna Ragoné, “The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete 
Donations and the Construction of Altruism” in Cook et al., supra 
note 72 at 209. 
111  Kashmeri, supra note 15 at 59. 




with approaches to ethics that stress women’s 
capacity for relatedness. The range of reasons 
my interviewees offered included empathy for 
other women who want to have children, being 
generous and wanting to help someone else, and 
familial love, obligation or responsibility.112 
 
Others noted that the ability to be a surrogate gave them a 
sense of uniqueness and accomplishment, enhanced their self-
esteem or allowed them to take special action.  Ragoné’s 
interviewees often described it as a “vocation or calling”.113  
Andrea Mechanick Braverman and Stephen Corson found 
(based on pre-conception psychological testing and interviews 
and follow-up after conception and delivery) that potential 
surrogate mothers have a strong need to be important and 
believe that by participating in surrogacy, they could make a 
unique and singular contribution.  As they had found 
pregnancy to be pleasurable, they felt they had skills to 
contribute to this arrangement.114  Kashmeri observes that 
“some accounts of surrogates keenly show that they live with 
these arrangements on their own terms and with a certain sense 
of empowerment”.115  One of Blyth respondent’s stated, “I’m 
not a mathematician or anything like that, I’m not a world class 
model, I’m just normal. And I didn’t want to be normal.  I 
                                                     
112  Rhonda Shaw, “Rethinking Reproductive Gifts as Body Projects” 
(2008) 42 Sociology 11 at 18.  She conducted in-depth interviews 
with 14 women in New Zealand about their experiences of egg 
donation and surrogate pregnancy.  Only four women in her study 
had been surrogates.  Shaw defines (at 24) “pro-social” as “actively 
sociable behaviours and practices that contribute to binding people 
and groups together”.   
113  Ragoné, supra note 69 at 55. 
114  Mechanick Braverman & Corson, supra note 79 at 356. See also 
Ragoné, supra note 69  at 59 
115    Kashmeri, supra note 15 at 11.  
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wanted to be interesting, I wanted to be able to say “I’ve done 
something interesting with my life”.116 
  
Many surrogate mothers (including nine of 19 in one 
study) reported that they enjoyed being pregnant and wanted to 
experience pregnancy again, but they did not want to raise 
more children.117  One woman said, 
 
[i]t’s given me the chance to experience a 
pregnancy and a birth when I’m in control, not 
the doctors. ...I know what I’m doing this time 
and I’m not going to allow things to be done to 
me that were done to me in my previous 
pregnancy ... One of the things that attracted me 
to surrogacy [was] the opportunity to have a 
pregnancy and birth without the responsibility of 
having a child to bring up after it.118 
 
 A few women in some studies were motivated by what 
could be called “reparative concerns”. Hohman and Hagan 
interviewed one woman who said that she had a child who had 
received an organ from an organ transplant. One way of giving 
thanks for the donation, she reasoned, was to be a surrogate 
mother.  Some of the surrogate mothers in Philip Parker’s and 
in Linda Kanefield’s research related their motives to having 
                                                     
116  Blyth, “Interesting”, supra note 71  at 192. 
117  Ibid.  See also Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 17; Hohman & 
Hagan, supra note 69; Kashmeri, supra note 15, Ragoné, Surrogate 
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Levine, “Gestational Surrogacy: Nature and Culture in Kinship” 
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had an abortion, to having given up of a child for adoption, and 
to the untimely loss of a family member.119 
 
Women engaged as surrogate mothers do not see 
themselves as passive participants in degrading, exploitative 
work or as selfless, childbearing vessels.  On the contrary,  
many surrogates become  involved because they want to help 
someone else to experience the joy of raising children, they 
truly enjoy being pregnant and want to experience pregnancy 
again without the obligation to raise the child, and they want to 
do something special, unique or unusual. 
  
The Relationship Between Surrogate Mothers and the 
Commissioning Parents 
 
Some have argued that surrogacy contracts heavily regulate the 
surrogate mother’s body and her conduct, including mobility, 
medication, diet and the ability to decide whether to terminate 
the pregnancy.  This process threatens to take control away 
from her and place it in the hands of the commissioning parents 
or agencies.  Gena Corea testified before the California 
Assembly Judiciary Committee in 1988 that one man in “... the 
surrogacy business ... intends to keep the inseminated women 
under constant surveillance by his private detectives throughout 
the nine months of their pregnancies. [The man said] that: ‘If 
we’re going to do the job 100 percent, we’re going to have to 
keep tabs on the women’”.120  All of the rationales given for 
prohibiting commercial surrogacy are engaged by these 
possibilities: such contracts are antithetical to personal 
autonomy and therefore are unconscionable; they are ripe with 
the potential for exploitation; and they seem to commodify 
                                                     
119  Philip. J. Parker, “Motivation of surrogate mothers: initial findings” 
(1983) 140 American Journal of Psychiatry 117 and Linda Kanefield, 
“The Reparative Motive in Surrogate Mothers” (1999) 2 Adoption 
Quarterly 5. 
120  Corea, supra note 67 at 327. 
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women as reproductive vessels.  Corea predicted that 
legitimating surrogacy would lead to “breeding brothels”.121 
  
The empirical research repeatedly shows that the 
quality of the surrogate mother’s relationship with the 
commissioning parent(s) during the pregnancy and after the 
birth largely determines the surrogate mother’s satisfaction 
with her experience.122  For example, Ragoné123 interviewed 
women who had been involved in surrogacy arrangements that 
had been facilitated by one of six agencies in the United States.  
Five agencies encouraged open relationships between surrogate 
mothers and commissioning parents, and one agency did not.  
Some surrogate mothers in the closed program experienced a 
great sense of loss after relinquishing the baby.  However, none 
of the surrogate mothers who were encouraged by the other 
five agencies to have a relationship with the commissioning 
parents expressed sadness or grief about parting with the baby.  
Five of the 17 surrogate mothers interviewed by Hohman and 
Hagan were in an arrangement with commissioning parents 
who lived in another country. Surrogate mothers expressed 
satisfaction when personal relationships developed in these 
situations, even though they were limited to a few visits or 
some telephone contact.  However, there were difficulties when 
the commissioning parents did little to acknowledge the 
surrogate mother or where the participants had different 
cultural expectations, especially around birth practices.   
                                                     
121   Ibid. at 327. 
122 Hohman & Hagen, supra note 69; Ciccarelli, supra note 69; 
Basilington, supra note 69; Jadva et al., supra note 18; Nancy Reame, 
Andrea Kalfoglu, & Hilary Hanafin “Long-term outcomes of 
surrogate pregnancy: A Report on  Surrogate mother’s satisfaction, 
life event and moral judgments ten years later”  (1998) 70 Fertility 
and Sterility S28 as referred to in Kleinpeter et al. supra note 73. 
123  Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 69 at 79. See also 
Ragoné, “Of Likeness and difference”, supra note 25.  




Jadva et al. reported that of 34 British surrogate 
mothers interviewed for their study, 97 percent had harmonious 
relationships with the commissioning parents at the beginning 
and end of the pregnancy.124  The one woman who had a 
difficult time with the commissioning parents at the beginning 
of the relationship reported that the issues were resolved before 
birth and that (at the time of the interview, which was at least 
one year later) they still had a good relationship.  No surrogate 
mother reported that her relationship was characterized by 
major conflict or hostility. This degree of harmoniousness is 
somewhat surprising given that they also reported that the 
commissioning mothers were “very involved” in the pregnancy 
in 83 percent of the cases and “moderately involved” in the rest  
(These results are surprising given, for example, van den 
Akker’s finding in a 2007 study of  twenty commissioning 
mothers in Britain that commissioning mothers’ “psychological 
responses during pregnancy were vigilant and slightly more 
anxious toward the end when the fetus was visible, viable and 
nearly born and relinquished to them”125).  The commissioning 
parents for 19 of 34 surrogate mothers interviewed for the 
Jadva et al. study were the interviewees for the Fiona 
MacCallum et al. research.126  They found a high degree of 
correlation between the commissioning parents and the 
surrogate mothers’ responses, notably on issues such as 
expectations during the pregnancy and the quality of the 
relationship that developed as the pregnancy progressed, which 
were generally highly positive. 
  
Remarkably, the findings in the Jadva et al. study are 
consistent with the findings in most other research.127  
                                                     
124  Jadva et al., supra note 18. 
125   van den Akker, [Psychological traits] supra note 69.  
126  MacCallum et al., supra note 73. 
127  van den Akker, “Experience of Surrogacy”, supra note 79; Kleinpeter 
& Hohman, supra note 69  and Basilington, supra note 69. 
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Basilington’s found that for four of 14 surrogate mothers the 
relationship with the couple was difficult (a figure that is 
higher than most) could have been prompted by the question, 
which was “what was the most difficult part of the process for 
you”?  The difficulty for one woman in Basilington’s study 
arose when the commissioning mother was diagnosed with a 
fatal disease and the commissioning father expressed doubts 
about being able to care for a dying wife and a newborn.  This 
situation induced severe anxiety in the surrogate mother, as she 
did not want to raise another child. When the commissioning 
mother’s diagnosis was changed and she was quickly treated, 
the surrogate mother’s anxiety ended and the baby was happily 
relinquished.  A 1998 study on women who had been surrogate 
mothers ten years earlier reported that half of the surrogates 
reported a negative relationship with the commissioning 
parents and a feeling that they were not appreciated.128 
  
Hohman and Hagan note that all of the 17 American 
surrogate mothers they interviewed “indicated that being 
treated with respect, honor and care [by the commissioning 
parents] were of utmost importance to them.  All felt that they 
were doing something unique, and wanted the immensity of 
this to be appreciated”.129  They found that problems arise 
when the motives and expectations of surrogate mothers and 
the commissioning parents do not match.  For example, some 
surrogate mothers felt used when they expected to have 
ongoing social contact after the birth with the commissioning 
parents but this did not happen. 
  
Surrogate mothers are more likely to be happy with the 
arrangement if they can exercise control before conception and 
                                                     
128  Reame et al., supra note 122.  Unfortunately, we were not able to 
obtain a copy of Reame’s paper, but given that its findings are quite 
different from most studies, we felt that it was important to mention 
the findings as reported by Kleinpeter et al. supra note 73.  
129  Hohman & Hagan, supra note 69 at 81. 




if all parties have a shared understanding of how the process 
will unfold.  The research demonstrated that many surrogate 
mothers are active agents in their choice of commissioning 
parents.130 van den Akker131 interviewed 29 women who were 
seeking surrogates.  Eight of the potential commissioning 
mothers had been interviewed by two potential surrogate 
mothers; three by three; and one by four.   Most parties 
interviewed by McCallum et al. met through an agency that 
had already pre-screened both the surrogate mothers and the 
commissioning parents.  On average, the parties (although 
usually the commissioning father was not there) met six times 
before the first attempt to conceive and 17 weeks passed 
between the first meeting and the first attempt.132  One 
surrogate mother interviewed by Hohman and Hagan said that 
she was not happy with her relationship with the 
commissioning parents during her first surrogacy pregnancy.  
In spite of this, she still entered into another surrogacy 
arrangement, but the second time around she carefully 
interviewed the couples to ensure that they had similar ideas 
about the relationship.  
 
 Kashmeri interviewed three Canadian lawyers involved 
in discussions between the parties to surrogacy arrangements.  
These discussions dealt with parties’ expectations regarding 
medical issues (including abortion and multi-fetal reduction), 
sharing information during the pregnancy, conduct and diet 
during pregnancy, disability and life insurance (in the event 
that something happened to the surrogate mother during the 
                                                     
130  See for example, Kleinpeter et al,. supra note 73. 
131  van den Akker, “Experience of Surrogacy”, supra note 79. 
132  McCallum et al..  See also Appleton, “Emotional”, supra note 72, for 
his observations on reasons why a potential surrogate mother decided 
not to entered into arrangement with potential commissioning 
parent(s) after meeting with them. 
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pregnancy), the payment of expenses (including childcare), 
income replacement, details on turning over the child after 
birth, parentage and post-birth contact.  However, Canadian 
law is clear that the pregnant woman alone is responsible for 
making health care decisions during a pregnancy.  The 
common law views the fetus as part of the woman’s body.  
Attempts by fathers or the state to interfere with a woman’s 
autonomy on the ground that others have an interest in her 
pregnancy have been rebuffed by courts in the last two 
decades.  Therefore,  it is unlikely that Canadian courts would 
enforce surrogacy arrangements concerning pre-natal conduct 
either.133  Under Canadian law, a surrogate mother could not 
voluntarily surrender her autonomy to make medical decisions 
and the commissioning parent(s) cannot exercise any real 
power to control her conduct during the pregnancy.  Like any 
competent adult, a surrogate mother also retains the right to 
confidentiality, including the ability to revoke her consent to 
third party information disclosure.  Good practice requires that 
health care providers should not care for both a surrogate 
mother and a commissioning mother where in vitro fertilization 
is being used.134 
  
Kashmeri observed from her interactions with 
surrogate mothers, commissioning parents and lawyers that 
they knew and understood that most elements of their 
relationship were not amenable to contractual regulation, such 
as conduct during the pregnancy and contact after delivery.135  
Therefore, the extra-legal aspects of the relationship were 
                                                     
133  See Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530; G.(D.F) v. Winnipeg 
Child and Family Services, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 and Dobson v. 
Dobson [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753. 
134  Dan R. Reilly, “Surrogate pregnancy:  a guide for Canadian prenatal 
health care providers” (2007) 176 Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 433.   
135   Kashmeri, supra note 15 at 64. 




extremely important. Her research notes that good 
communication, strong ties, and a high level of trust between 
surrogate mothers and commissioning parents are necessary for 
the relationship to work.136 
  
Kashmeri’s research, which included active 
participation in on-line support groups for surrogate mothers, 
found that many surrogacy negotiations in Canada are 
conducted without the benefit of legal or other professional 
advice.  As a result, the parties may fail to discuss important 
issues.  Some potential surrogate mothers attempted to gather 
advice on negotiation and other topics from on-line discussion 
groups. Blyth found that solicitors were the professional group 
most likely to receive criticism from participants because of 
their lack of knowledge of and experience with surrogacy 
arrangements. 
  
The immediate consequences of the failure or inability 
to get sound advice can be quite detrimental to the surrogate 
mother.  While writing this piece in mid-2009, we heard of a 
Canadian woman who was about to deliver twins for a couple 
from a European country.137 An agency in X province 
connected them, but the surrogate mother who lived in Y 
province never actually met with anyone from the agency or 
with the commissioning parents, although it was planned that 
she would meet them just prior to the delivery.  She was to be 
paid $15,000 plus expenses and seemed unaware that such an 
agreement was illegal in Canada.  The commissioning parents 
may have sought a Canadian surrogate mother because the 
costs are about one-half of what they would be in the United 
                                                     
136   Ibid. at chapter IV. 
137  The surrogate mother contacted a friend just days before birth in the 
hope that she might be able to give her some information on 
surrogacy laws and the friend, in turn, who knew of our research, 
contacted one of the authors.  The surrogate mother’s story is told in 
this paper with her permission. 
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States (where a surrogate is usually paid $20,000-30,000 (plus 
expenses)) and British law would not permit the 
commissioning mother’s name to be on the birth certificate 
immediately after the birth.  As well, the medical expenses 
related to the pregnancy and the delivery would be picked up 
by the Canadian state rather than the couple (Most private 
health care plans in the United States require separate coverage 
for surrogate pregnancies).  Surprisingly, a fertility clinic in her 
home city, successfully implanted three embryos in her and 
when all three successfully implanted, she was told (it is not 
clear by whom) that selective reduction to twins was 
“necessary”.   
 
The surrogate mother was told at the last minute that 
the delivery “must” take place in Z province, because the 
commissioning parents had learned that this jurisdiction would 
issue the original birth registration in the commissioning 
parent’s names rather than in her name.  She then became 
afraid that the medical bills related to her delivery might be 
billed to her directly when she returned to her home province.  
Those bills would far exceed what she was getting paid to be a 
surrogate and, of course, they would only come in after the 
commissioning couple and the twins had left the country. Only 
then, now holed up and alone with her children in an hotel in a 
strange city and about to deliver, did she finally try to get some 
advice on what her liability for the medical expenses would be.  
If she had been able to get proper advice before conception, 
issues like the number of implants, selective reduction, place of 
birth and payment of expenses (including use of a trust 
account) could have been properly dealt with.  In the fog of 
surrogacy law in Canada, such scenarios are likely to continue, 
making women like her ripe for exploitation.   
  
The empirical research shows that surrogate mothers 
can be active agents in determining whether they will work 
with a commissioning couple.  Often they want and expect 
commissioning parents (especially the commissioning mother) 




to be involved during the pregnancy.  None of the studies 
support the conclusion that surrogate mothers lose their 
personal autonomy during the pregnancy; rather, they report 
harmonious relationships with commissioning parents.  
Provided that they have access to appropriate support and 
advice, there is little evidence to suggest that surrogate mothers 
lack the ability to negotiate expectations and maintain 
appropriate boundaries with commissioning parents, thereby 
avoiding exploitation and commodification of themselves and 
the child during the pregnancy. However, if they cannot, or are 
hesitant to, get this information-and their ability to do so is 
exacerbated by the state of Canadian law rather than facilitated 
by it-anecdotal evidence demonstrates that how surrogate 
mothers can be exploited. 
 
The Emotions of the Surrogate Mother During and After 
Pregnancy  
   
Phyllis Chesler asserted that separating women from their 
biological infants would cause trauma and injury to both the 
mother and the child.138  Allen believed that “there are risks 
inherent in surrogacy arrangements.  These risks centrally 
include the emotional devastation experienced by surrogates 
who are compelled to give up the children that they have 
agreed to bear for others”.139   The British Medical Association 
and others feared that because a surrogate mother cannot 
predict the full extent of the maternal bond, she may face 
unanticipated emotional risks when faced with the decision to 
give up a child.140  The Baby M decision voided the contract 
                                                     
138   Chesler, supra note 3. 
139  Allen, supra note 6 at 17.  
140  British Medical Association, Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations – 
Report of the Working Party on Human Infertility Services (London: 
British Medical Association, 1990). See also Overall, “Human 
Reproduction”, supra note 6. 
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between the surrogate mother and the commissioning father on 
the ground that no woman could consent to relinquishment 
prior to the birth of a child.141  Others were concerned that the 
physical and hormonal changes and emotional volatility of 
pregnancy might impact a surrogate mother’s feelings towards 
the pregnancy.142  The RCNRT stated that if the surrogate 
mother “succeeds in denying her emotional responses during 
this profound experience, she is dehumanized in the 
process”.143  Therefore, at best, women should not be 
encouraged to relinquish children and, at the very least, 
voluntary informed consent is simply not possible until 
sometime after the birth of a child.144 
  
The empirical research, however, does not support the 
concerns about pre-natal maternal bonding or emotional 
instability during pregnancy.  van den Akker’s 2007 study of 
61 British surrogate mothers reported that anxiety was not high 
during the pregnancy among surrogate mothers and 
“detachment is reported early and maintained throughout the 
pregnancy, with little post-variation post-delivery”.145  She also 
found that surrogate mothers had “consistent mid range scores 
on attitudes towards the pregnancy” which is “likely to reflect 
                                                     
141  Supra note 2. 
142  See Shalev, supra note 9 for a literature review. 
143  RCNRT, supra note 5 at 685. 
144 Anita Allen argues that surrogate mothers have an inalienable 
constitutional right to a post-natal opportunity to change their mind 
about relinquishing parental rights:  “Privacy, Surrogacy and the 
Baby M Case” (1988) 76 Geo.L.J. 1759.  
145  van den Akker, “Psychological trait”, supra note 74;  S.  Fischer & I. 
Gillman, in “Surrogate motherhood: attachment, attitudes and social 
support” (1991) 54 Psychiatry 13; Blyth, [Interesting] supra note 71  
[1994]; and, van den Akker supra note 79 [Experiences of Surrogacy] 
also report the finding from their interviews with surrogate mothers 
that they are less attached to the fetus.   




their continued attempts to dissociate meaning to the pregnancy 
in an attempt to remain detached from it”.146  In contrast, she 
found that the commissioning mothers “appear to be healthy, 
inquisitive and to show concerns coupled with positive feelings 
toward the fetus which are likely to reflect an attempt to form a 
bond or attachment to the fetus.”147  Other studies show that 
most surrogate mothers did not think of the fetus as theirs; they 
considered it to be for the commissioning parents from the 
beginning of the process and demonstrated lower attachment 
during pregnancy than other pregnant women.148  One out of 14 
American women in Ciccarelli’s 1997 study felt that she had 
bonded with the child and two others identified strong 
mothering instincts, but 11 of 14 stated that they did not feel 
any attachment.  One woman stated that “I almost felt guilty 
for not feeling bad about giving up the baby”149 and even the 
three women who felt attached to the baby were not reluctant to 
relinquish the child.  Basilington found that “a strong 
psychological component was evident in the conscious effort 
by surrogate mothers to think of the surrogacy arrangement as 
being a job with payment and not to think of the baby was 
theirs”.150  Ragoné concluded from her interviews with 
surrogate mothers that “it is the ability or strength to be able to 
separate oneself from the pregnancy/child that surrogates 
consider a prerequisite of surrogate motherhood”.151 
  
                                                     
146  van den Akker, “Psychological trait”, supra note 74. 
147  Ibid. 
148  Edelmann, supra note 88 at 130; Fischer & Gillman supra note 145.  
See also,  Kristy Stevens & Emma Dally, Surrogate Mother: One 
Woman’s Story (London: Century Publishing, 1985). 
149  Ciccarelli, supra note 69 at 56. 
150  Basilington, supra note 69 at 67. 
151  Ragoné, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 69 at 78. 
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Hohman and Hagan found that how the actual delivery 
and transition was handled by the commissioning parents was 
an important determinant of satisfaction with the process.152  
The research reports that for almost all surrogate mothers, 
relinquishment was a happy event that contributed to an 
increased sense of self-worth and self-confidence.153  Speaking 
about their feelings after the birth, many surrogate mothers 
commented on the joy of the moment when the child was 
handed to the commissioning parents.  One surrogate mother 
stated that 
 
[the best part] was giving [the commissioning 
parents] a daughter.  It is a humbling experience.  
When I gave [the baby] to [the commissioning 
mother] she stated, “I’m holding my dream.  Not 
many people get to do that in their lifetime”.  
And that to me summed it all up, I’d given her 
dream.154 
 
 Few women regretted participating in surrogacy or 
experienced distress on giving up the child after birth.  Three of 
the 19 women  in Basilington’s study stated that they felt some 
attachment to the child after birth.  However, these feelings 
were transitory for two of the women and, notably, both 
experienced good relationships with the commissioning 
parents.  While one woman continued to feel distress two and a 
half years after the birth, her distress was not over losing the 
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child.  Rather it was because the commissioning father was 
disrespectful during the pregnancy and the birth, that she 
doubted his suitability for parenthood, and her requests for 
photographs and other information were ignored.  No studies 
reported any surrogate mothers who reached clinical levels of 
depression after relinquishing the child.   
 
Jadva et al. found that “all of the [34] women [who 
were interviewed at least one year after relinquishing the child] 
were happy with the decision reached about when to hand over 
the baby and none has experienced any doubts or difficulties 
whilst handing over the baby”.155  Thirty-two percent of the 
surrogate mothers reported that they had had some difficulties 
in the weeks following the handover. At the time of the 
interview, two women still had some difficulties, with 94 
percent expressing none at all.  These findings are consistent 
with those of Ciccarelli who interviewed women five to 10 
years after serving as surrogates.  The women interviewed said 
that they were “quite satisfied” with their experiences.156 Other 
longitudinal studies also showed that positive attitudes 
remained stable over time.157  Teman concluded, following a 
review of the research, that “almost all of the studies ... find, in 
the end, that the overwhelming majority of surrogates do not 
regret their decision and they even express feelings of pride 
and accomplishment”.158 
                                                     
155  Jadva et al., supra note 18 at 200. 
156  Ciccarelli, supra note 69. 
157  van den Akker, “Psychological trait”, supra note 73; van den Akker, 
“Psychosocial aspects”, supra note 16; Elly Teman, The birth of a 
mother: mythologies of surrogate motherhood in Israel (PhD. 
Dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of 
Sociology and Anthropology, 2006) as cited in Teman, supra note 12  
at 1104 and in Birthing a Mother: A Surrogate’s Body and the 
Pregnant Self (University of California Press, forthcoming February 
2010). 
158  Teman, supra note 12 at 1109. 
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As noted earlier, the most significant factor in 
determining satisfaction is the relationship with the 
commissioning parents during and after the pregnancy.  The 
research159 consistently shows that it is closeness with the 
couple, not with the child, that is important. Blyth reports that 
many surrogate mothers wanted some contact because they 
believed that it would be better for the child to have a loose 
connection to them.160  Jadva et al. reported that 18 percent of 
the parties agreed prior to conception that the surrogate mother 
would have no continuing involvement with the child after the 
pregnancy.  All others would have some kind of involvement. 
94 percent of the surrogate mothers were happy with the level 
of contact they had. 
 
 Surrogate mothers rarely refused to relinquish a child 
after birth. Only two such refusals were noted in the interview-
based studies (Blyth and Basilington) reviewed for this paper.  
The surrogate mother in the Basilington study had previously 
relinquished a child without any difficulties but she refused to 
relinquish the second child to different commissioning parents 
because she had strong doubt about the father’s suitability for 
parenthood.  In 1999, van den Akker surveyed five clinics and 
two agencies in Britain on the rate of refusals to relinquish by 
the surrogate mother or refusal to accept by the commissioning 
parent(s).  Only one establishment reported any refusals to 
relinquish.161  As noted earlier, there have been almost no 
reported decisions in the last 20 years in Canada, the United 
States, or Britain involving a dispute between surrogate 
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does not indicate how many refusals there were. 




mothers and the commissioning parents.162  The professional 
team at a large clinic in England reported that they 
“encountered no serious clinical, ethical or legal problems in 
nine years”.163  Internet research failed to reveal any media 
accounts in the last two decades of refusals to relinquish or 
other disputes between parties to surrogacy arrangements other 
than those already described.  There are no reports of 
commissioning parents refusing to accept a child, in any of the 
empirical research reviewed for this paper, although there are 
some accounts in other sources, such as the Baby Manji case in 
India, which will be referred to later.  
  
The empirical research demonstrates that surrogate 
mothers are not subject to emotional volatility during 
pregnancy and that they do not become pre-natally attached to 
the fetus.  Very few women express distress and when they do, 
the distress is related to the relationship with the 
commissioning parents, not over relinquishing the child.  Only 
in very few cases do surrogate mothers refuse to give up the 
child.  The lack of regret and distress expressed by women who 
choose to be surrogates indicates that they make their decisions 
with informed consent, an understanding of what the surrogacy 
arrangement requires and a confidence that they can carry 
through with their initial decision to participate in surrogacy. 
     
The Health of Outcomes for Surrogate Mothers  
 
Few studies by social scientists discuss the short- or 
long-term health implications for the surrogate mother as a 
consequence of the pregnancy or delivery; when they do, the 
information on the medical issues is not detailed.  Most 
researchers ask open-ended questions about negative aspects of 
                                                     
162  See the text accompanying notes 22 to 59. 
163  Brinsden et al., supra note 85. 
 
74        CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010] 
 
or regrets about participating in a surrogacy arrangement.  In 
most studies, the surrogate mothers did not report physical 
effects in response to this question.  An exception to this was 
that three of 17 surrogate mothers in the Hohman and Hagan 
study talked about their difficult births.  However, all three said 
that they were happy with the decision to be surrogate mothers 
and, while relationships with the commissioning parents were 
positive, they regretted having difficult births and, therefore, 
would not be entering into another surrogacy arrangement.164 
  
We reviewed a handful of studies by researchers based 
in the medical sciences and they also show that the short- and 
long-term health implications for surrogate mothers are not 
heightened.165  Dan Reilly notes   
  
[t]he literature regarding the medical risks 
associated with surrogate pregnancy is limited to 
a few case series.  It remains to be determined if 
the obstetric risks are the same as those for any 
other pregnancy derived by in vitro fertilization 
with the same number of fetuses.  Most case 
series report no increase in adverse events 
related to surrogate pregnancy.166 
 
Parkinson et al. reported that all 95 surrogate mothers in their 
study were healthy at the beginning of the process and, noting 
that they had all given birth to at least two children already, 
found that the incidence of commonly experienced health 
problems during their previous pregnancies was low (van den 
Akker made the same observation167).  Interestingly, surrogate 
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mothers were three times more likely to be on bed rest for pre-
term labour than other pregnant women with the same 
condition.  This difference might suggest that surrogate 
mothers are given the resources, including income replacement 
and childcare, to take optimum care of themselves during the 
pregnancy.  One surrogate mother, out of 95, had a difficult 
birth that resulted in a caesarean hysterectomy, but otherwise 
no one was reported in any study to have experienced a 
pregnancy or birth that resulted in serious short-term or 
significant long-term health effects.  
  
Parkinson et al. also found that five of 95 British 
surrogate mothers experienced “mild transient postpartum 
‘maternal blues’, but that no cases of documented neurotic 
postpartum depression occurred in IVF-surrogates”.168  This 
finding is consistent with other studies.  For example, none of 
the women in the Jadva et al. study ever had a score above the 
cut-off indicated for clinical depression.  This includes the two 
of the 34 surrogate mothers who were still expressing difficulty 
with the decision to relinquish the child one year after birth.  
Surprisingly, 20 percent (of the 61) surrogate mothers in van 
den Akker’s longitudinal study self-reported post-natal 
depression in their previous pregnancies in an interview held 
after they had decided to enter a surrogacy arrangement, but 
before becoming pregnant.  Van den Akker   comments that 
“clearly counseling and screening was not sufficiently 
adequate”.169  However, at a second interview, held six months 
after delivery, none of the surrogate mothers reported post-
natal depression. 
  
The decision to become pregnant, either to give birth to 
a child that one will raise or to give to someone else to raise, 
                                                     
168  Parkinson et al., supra note 85 at 674. 
169  van den Akker, “Longitudinal comparison”, supra note 69 at 281. 
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carries with it an acceptance of emotional and physical risks.  
Because almost all the women who have been surrogate 
mothers had given birth prior to making this decision, they 
already had a good idea of what the specific risks were for 
them. It is not surprising, therefore, that surrogate mothers 
report few complications during the pregnancy, delivery and 
post-delivery. While risk cannot be avoided altogether, the 
risks can be minimized if potential surrogate mothers have 
access to good screening for mental and physical issues prior to 
conception and the resources to take good care of themselves 
during the pregnancy.  
 
The Expectations of Children in Surrogate Arrangements  
  
It has been argued that surrogacy may be bad for children 
because they may be angry at the women who abandoned them 
or that commissioning parents may be over-protective of the 
children or have unrealistic expectations if they have had to 
pay a high price for them.170  Concerns were expressed that 
commissioning parents would refuse to accept the child, or to 
pay the surrogate mother, if the child was disabled.  The 
RCNRT stated that “preconception arrangements will alter 
society’s understanding of parenthood, family and parental 
responsibilities, reducing parenthood to a transaction ... with 
the child as the product of the deal”.171 
 
 A 2004 literature review concludes that there are “few, 
if any, psychological differences between children conceived 
by [assisted reproductive technologies] and those conceived 
naturally with regard to emotions, behaviour, the presence of 
psychological disorders or their perceptions of the quality of 
                                                     
170  Linda Burns, “An exploratory study of perceptions of parenting after 
infertility” (1990) 8 Family Systems Medicine 177. 
171   Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, supra note 
5. 




family relationships”.172  In a 2006 study, Sandra Golombok et 
al. studied the relationship between the children and their 
families at the time of the child’s third birthday. Sixty-seven 
families with a child conceived through heterosexual 
intercourse between the parents were compared with 34 
surrogacy families, 41 assisted insemination families and 41 
oocyte donation families.  They found higher levels of warmth 
and interaction between the assisted reproduction families than 
in other families.  They concluded that “it appears that the 
absence of a genetic and/or gestational link between parents 
and their child does not have a negative impact on parent-child 
relationships or the psychological well-being of mother, father 
or children at age 3”.173  
 
 Guichon refers to on-line blogs where some now-adult 
offspring of surrogacy arrangements are expressing 
unhappiness because they perceive that they were rejected or 
abandoned by their surrogate mother.174  On the other hand, as 
soon as she turned 18, Baby M initiated legal proceedings to 
allow her commissioning mother to adopt her and to terminate 
any legal rights her surrogate mother might have had.  She 
stated that she was happy with her family.175  No empirical 
                                                     
172  Edelmann, supra note 88 at 134. 
173  Sandra Golombok, Clare Murray, Vasanti Jadva, Emma Lycett, Fiona 
MacCallum, & J. Rust., “Non-genetic and non-gestational 
parenthood: consequences for parent-child relationships and the 
psychological well-being of mothers, fathers and children at the age 
of 3” (2006) 21 Human Reproduction 1918.  See also van den Akker, 
“Psychological trait”, supra note 73. 
174  Guichon, supra note 20. 
175 “Now It’s Melissa’s Time,” New Jersey Monthly (6 March 2007),  
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studies have been conducted on the experiences of now–adult 
children born of surrogacy arrangements.  
 
 van den Akker states that “to date, the author is not 
aware of any disabled surrogate births, but this is a possibility 
in the future”.176  Based on a survey of seven clinics and 
agencies involved in surrogacy, she also reports that  no 
commissioning parents have refused to take a child.177  The 
Parkinson et al. review (which included a review of the 
medical files of 95 surrogate mothers and included birth 
details) mentions that there was testing for fetal anomalies but 
is silent on whether there were any abortions.  However, there 
were five multi-fetal reductions where three sets of quads and 
two sets of triplets were each reduced to twins.  There were no 
fetal reductions during the last three years of a nine year study 
period (1989-97), because the clinic reduced the number of 
embryos it would implant.  This review notes that four children 
of the 128 born had minor disabilities:  two with cysts, one 
with a cleft palate, and one with duodenal atresia.  As noted 
earlier, no study reviewed for this paper indicated that any 
commissioning parents had rejected the children born to a 
surrogate mother.  
 
 While the empirical research is limited, it does not 
support the theory that commissioning parents will be over-
protective of their children or have unrealistic expectations of 
them.  There is no evidence of commissioning parents rejecting 
children who do not meet their expectations.  Changing societal 
norms on what it means to be a parent are not inherently 
undesirable.  Indeed these norms have been altered 
significantly in the last 50 years to meet new social conditions.  
Canadian laws do not require that parents have a genetic 
connection to a child to be legally recognized as a parent.  
                                                     
176  van den Akker, “Psychosocial aspects”, supra note 16. 
177  van den Akker, “Organizational selection”,  supra note 84. 




Adoptions have always been accepted in Canada and 
anonymous sperm donor assistance has been used by 
heterosexual couples for half a century; these methods of 
family formation are now more widely available to single 
people and same-sex couples.  More recently, other non-
genetic parent-child relationships have been recognized, such 
as de facto parenting and birth registrations in the name of two 
women or more than two people as parents where this 
arrangement is consistent with the intention of the registrants at 
the time of conception.  It is hard to follow the argument that 
pre-conception agreements reduce parenthood to a transaction.  
That “transaction” is but the first step to becoming a parent, 
with most of the work of “family and parental responsibilities” 
yet to come.  Thus, neither altered social understandings nor 
the fact of a transaction are convincing arguments against 
surrogacy arrangements. 
 
The Motivations of Commissioning Parents  
  
Some are concerned that commercial surrogacy commodifies 
women’s reproductive capacities because it allows wealthy 
women to buy their way out of the burden of having to be 
pregnant.  The influential Warnock Report in England (1984) 
and other reports178 voiced strong concerns that women would 
seek surrogacy mothers for convenience.  Health Canada stated 
in a consultation paper on permissible expenses for surrogates 
that  
 
... the commercialization of the human 
reproductive capacity is not in keeping with 
                                                     
178  Mary Warnock, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Cmnd 9314 (London, HMSO, 1984).  
See also Mary Warnock, A Question of Life:  The Warnock Report on 
Human Fertilization and Embryology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1985), and Field, supra note 6. 
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Canadian values.  Canadians feel strongly that 
human life is a gift that should not be bought 
and sold, or treated like a consumer commodity.  
A guiding principle of the AHR Act is to prevent 
trade in the reproductive capabilities of women 
and men.179 
 
The British Medical Association180 and Human Fertilization 
and Embryology Act both stress that surrogate mothers should 
only be available when the commissioning mother cannot carry 
or it is highly undesirable for her to carry a fetus to term.  The 
research demonstrates that there is no evidence that 
commissioning mothers are seeking surrogacy to avoid the 
inconvenience, physical effects or career impacts of their own 
pregnancy.181  Rather, it shows that all commissioning mothers 
were infertile, unable to carry a fetus to term, or had a serious 
medical conditions that makes pregnancy dangerous for them.   
  
SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FEMINIST THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The empirical research focusing on surrogate mothers in 
Britain and the United States does not support concerns that 
they are being exploited by these arrangements, that they 
cannot give meaningful consent to participating, or that the 
arrangements commodify women or children. Money is a 
motivator for some participants, but for most, the decision to 
participate comes out of a desire to help a childless couple, to 
do something unusual or to make a unique contribution.  Of 
course, there are women disappointed by the process and there 
                                                     
179 Health Canada, “Reimbursement of Expenses under the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act: Public Consultation Paper” (no date),  
online at: www.hc-sc.gc.ca. 
180   British Medical Association, supra note 140. 
181  Edelmann, supra note 88 at 127. 




are situations in which women are treated poorly by agencies 
or commissioning parents.  But, overwhelmingly, the research 
demonstrates that the women who become surrogate mothers 
go into the process  on their own initiative, with a strong sense 
of what it is that they are committing to and that they rarely 
regret having been a surrogate mother.  They have satisfying 
relationships with the commissioning parents during the 
pregnancy and after the delivery.  Situations in the last two 
decades where surrogate mothers refuse to relinquish children 
are extremely rare, as are situations where commissioning 
parents refuse to accept them.  Limited research indicates that 
the children born of these arrangements are doing well.   
 
 Problems arise when women do not have access to 
information and advice before making the decision to  
participate in a surrogacy arrangement and when they cannot 
engage as active agents in the choice of commissioning 
parents. While the research is limited, this situation may 
exacerbated in Canada where the state of surrogacy law inhibits 
women who are considering becoming involved in surrogacy 
from getting the information that they need.  Commercial 
surrogacy arrangements are being made in Canada between 
both Canadian residents and non-residents in spite of the 
prohibition and, all signs indicate that the practice of using 
surrogacy arrangements will continue to grow.  In light of these 
findings, Canadian governments should replace a criminal 
prohibition against commercial surrogacy arrangements with a 
regulatory regime that minimizes the potential for the 
exploitation and commodification of surrogates and children.  
 
SURROGACY ARRANGMENTS ACROSS BORDERS 
  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in detail, 
we must note that there is some anecdotal evidence that 
Canadian residents are commissioning women in other 
countries, notably India and the United States, to be surrogate 
mothers because it is easier or cheaper to find surrogate 
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mothers in those countries.  As well, Canadian commissioning 
parents engage American women as surrogates (and pay 
commercial rate fees) but arrange for the women to come to 
Canada to give birth, thereby saving on medical expenses and 
avoiding issues related to citizenship and the immediate need 
for a passport for the child.  In spite of the criminal prohibition 
on commercial surrogacy, non-Canadians have commissioned 
Canadian surrogate mothers, perhaps because they know that 
the law is not being enforced here and to save on medical 
expenses.182 
 
Surrogacy contracts in India are virtually unregulated.  
Media accounts and some journalists183  suggest that Indian 
women are being exploited and abused, including being subject 
to severe constraints on liberty during the pregnancy.  Some 
women are only paid after they give birth and only if the 
commissioning parents agree to accept the child.  According to 
some accounts, children have been rejected by commissioning 
parents, who can renege on these contracts with impunity.  
Nolan for instance, reports, 
 
“[t]hese surrogate mothers are just being kept 
there like baby factories”, said Nandita Rao, a 
lawyer pushing for regulation of the fertility 
industry. “The women are just sitting there 
producing a child with no rights to that child and 
                                                     
182  See Kashmeri supra note 15; Gazze supra note 15, and the text 
accompanying note 137.  
183  See Stephanie Nolan, “Desperate Mothers Fuel India’s Baby 
Factories” Globe and Mail (13 February 2009). See also Sarmishta 
Subramanian, “Wombs for Rent” Maclean’s (2 July 2007), online: 
Macleans.ca <www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=20070702_1070 
62_107062>.  Rengachary Smerdon, supra note 13 and Ruparelia, 
supra note 64. 
 




no rights on their health--the contract says that if 
you don’t produce the child, you don’t get the 
money—so they go on with the pregnancy no 
matter what [the risk] and there is no maximum 
number of times they can do this.  In India, 
which is so fiercely patriarchal, many are using 
their daughters as baby-churning factories”.184 
 
 Since the early 2000s, India has actively developed its 
medical tourism industry. The reproductive portion of this 
market is valued at over $450 million (U.S.) per year and is 
expected to increase.185  In 2005, the Indian Council for 
Medical Research (ICMR) published the non-binding 
“National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & 
Regulation of ART Clinics in India”. These guidelines, 
amongst other regulations, support commercial surrogacy, 
permit gestational surrogacy only and state that the birth 
certificate should be in the genetic parents’ names.186  ICMR 
released a draft of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
(Regulation) Bill (2008) for public comment and it received 
first reading in December, 2008.187 This bill was influenced by 
the Baby Manji (2008) case where a child born to a surrogate 
mother was left in legal limbo when her genetic parents 
divorced before her birth.188  The commissioning father wanted 
                                                     
184  Nolan, ibid., and Subramanian, ibid.  
185  Rengachary Smerdon, supra note 13 at 24. 
186 Indian Council for Medical Research, “National Guidelines for 
Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of ART Clinics in India”, 
avalable online: Indian Council for Medical Research 
<http://icmr.nic.in/art/art_clinics.htm>. 
187  Rengachary Smerdon, supra note 13 at 42. 
188  The reasons for decision in Baby Manji Yamada v. India (2008) (Sup. 
Ct. India) are available at: http://blog.indiansurrogacylaw.com/ 
tag/surrogate-mother-contract/  
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to adopt but Indian law would not allow a single father to 
adopt.  Neither the surrogate mother nor the commissioning 
mother wanted the child. The father could not take the baby 
home to Japan because the Japanese embassy said she needed 
Indian travel documents because she was born in India. 
However, in India, a child’s travel documents are linked to the 
mother so the baby had none.  Eventually, the paternal 
grandmother adopted the child. She was finally issued a 
“certificate of identity” (which are given to people who are 
stateless or cannot get passports from their home country) 
which allowed the father to apply for a Japanese visa to bring 
the child to Japan. 189   
 
The 2008 bill, as with the guidelines, only regulates 
gestational surrogacy and prohibits surrogate mothers from 
having a genetic link to the child.190  Among other things, this 
bill makes surrogacy agreements enforceable contracts in 
which the surrogate mother renounces all parental rights; it 
requires surrogate mothers are required to be between the ages 
of 21 and 45 and participating women are limited to a 
maximum of three pregnancies.  The commissioning parents’ 
names would be on the birth certificate from the time of birth 
and the child would be considered their child even if they 
divorce. They would be required to pay all the surrogate’s 
costs, have proof that they can take the child out of India and 
appoint a local guardian to care for the surrogate.191  
 
Given the heightened potential for exploitation of 
surrogate mothers involved in international surrogacy 
arrangements, consideration should be given to prohibiting 
                                                     
189 “Japan gate-pass for baby Manji” The Telegraph (17 October 2008), 
online: The Telegraph <http://www.telegraphindia.com/10810 
18/jsp/nation/ story_9984517.jsp>. 
190  Supra note 187 at 17-18. 
191  Ibid. at 42-43. 




Canadian residents from engaging non-resident surrogate 
mothers and possibly prohibiting non-residents from engaging 
resident surrogate mothers unless Canada has entered into 
reciprocal protocols with these countries.   
 
THE REGULATORY REGIME ON SURROGACY IN 
CANADA – WHAT IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE 
 
The federal government’s authority to enact the AHRA can only 
be founded in the criminal law power.  Otherwise, its 
jurisdiction to make laws related to surrogacy must be ancillary 
to another power, such as the citizenship of a child born to 
surrogacy participants where one of them is not a Canadian 
resident.  The criminal law power requires that, in purpose and 
effect, the law prohibits highly undesirable activities and 
attaches penal consequences to those who engage in such 
activities.  Perforce, it is a blunt instrument that is not well 
suited to the governance of complex human interactions.  
Canadian law prohibits parties to a surrogacy arrangement or 
any third parties from exchanging any money unless it is for 
payment of expenses, as set out in the regulations.  As no 
regulations have been made in the five years since the act 
passed, even the payment of expenses could attract criminal 
liability.  Nonetheless, Canadian residents are making 
surrogacy arrangements. The empirical evidence in Britain and 
the United States indicates that the participants’ experiences, 
motives, personal characteristics, circumstances, and ability to 
develop relationships—and not whether money changes 
hands—are the determinants of satisfaction with surrogacy 
arrangements. It also establishes that most participants are 
satisfied with the process.  By failing to accommodate the 
highly individualistic and inter-personal nature of surrogacy 
arrangements, the current criminal law regime simultaneously 
denies women personal autonomy and exacerbates the potential 
for their exploitation.  
  
86        CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010] 
 
The primary goal of a legal regime governing 
surrogacy arrangements must be to ensure both that women 
have the ability to make an informed decision to become a 
surrogate mother and the power to exercise that capacity 
properly, including the ability to resist pressure to participate in 
surrogacy or be controlled by others during the pregnancy.  
Only the provinces have the comprehensive ability to pass laws 
that can take into account the complexity of surrogacy 
arrangements and therefore the federal AHRA should be 
replaced, or at least supplemented, by192 provincial regulatory 
regimes. As the needs of (potential) surrogate mothers are the 
same regardless of the kind of surrogacy, the regime should 
govern traditional, gestational, commercial and gratuitous 
surrogacy arrangements and include any arrangement where 
either the surrogate mother or the commissioning parent(s) are 
Canadian residents.  
 
 A regulatory regime must ensure that all parties 
interested in participating in surrogacy are screened for 
physical, financial, and emotional vulnerabilities before any 
other steps are taken.  In order to have sufficient knowledge of 
the physical and emotional risks they face during a pregnancy 
and after birth, only women who have given birth (following 
low risk pregnancies and deliveries), have completed their 
families, and are confident of their ability to be a surrogate 
                                                     
192  The AHRA permits provinces to pass laws concerning assisted human 
reproduction as long as those laws are not inconsistent with federal 
policy. Under the heading “Equivalency Agreements”, s. 68.1 
provides that “the Governor in Council may, by order, declare that 
any or all of sections 10 to 16 … and any corresponding regulations 
do not apply in a province … if the Minister and the government of 
that province agree in writing that there are laws of the province in 
force that are equivalent to those sections and the corresponding 
provisions in the regulations”.  Therefore, the suggestions contained 
in this section of the paper, with the exception of a permissive stance 
on commercial surrogacy, could be enacted by provinces without 
repeal of the federal law. 




mother should participate. Women whose sole reason for 
participating is to overcome financial hardship or those who 
live with serious mental health issues, such as a history of post-
natal depression or fragile personalities, should not be accepted 
as surrogate mothers, because the potential for exploitation or 
other adverse consequences is too significant.  The interest in 
participating in surrogacy usually comes from the potential 
surrogate mother herself.   Screeners need to be alert to the 
possibility that a woman might be under pressure from others 
to participate and, especially where the initial idea did not 
come from the potential surrogate mother, they should take 
special care to determine if there is pressure on her to 
participate.  Commissioning parents should be screened to 
ensure that they have the financial wherewithal to participate in 
a surrogacy arrangement and, where a couple is involved, to 
ensure that both members are in agreement that surrogacy is 
something that they want to try.  The reasons for seeking 
surrogacy should be explored as surrogacy simply for their 
convenience should not be encouraged.  While there is no 
evidence to support the concern that surrogacy will lead to 
baby-selling, the screener could also determine if this was, in 
fact, the commissioning parents’ intention.  If the 
commissioning parents are friends or family of the potential 
surrogate mother, they may also provide information to 
screeners on whether she is being pressured to participate.  
  
 The empirical evidence clearly establishes that formal 
and informal pre-conception relationships building between the 
potential surrogate mothers and commissioning parents are key 
to the success of the arrangements.  All parties should receive 
separate advice and counselling on issues that might arise 
during the pregnancy, delivery, and after the birth, including 
medical issues, conduct and diet, insurance, compensation, 
expenses, place of birth, exchange of the child, parentage, and 
post-birth contact.  The objective of such counselling include 
discussing specific anxieties, facilitating decision-making, and 
ensuring that issues are identified and resolved at an early 
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stage.193  Only after the relationship is established are the 
parties ready to come to specific mutual understandings about 
how the process should unfold if the surrogate mother becomes 
pregnant.  As most surrogate pregnancies are achieved at 
fertility clinics, the clinics could be required to ensure that 
parties are screened and have received separate and 
independent and then joint counselling and advice on 
formulating their arrangement before attempting any 
fertilization or implantation procedures.  
  
The Canadian Bar Association has recommended that 
the expense of obtaining legal advice should be a 
compensatable expense for surrogate mothers and they should 
be encouraged to obtain independent legal advice prior to 
entering into any form of a surrogacy contract.194 Lawyers are 
also well placed to handle financial aspects of the 
arrangements, particularly if trust funds are created from which 
to pay compensation and expenses.  Care must be taken to 
ensure against creating an erroneous impression that surrogacy 
arrangement frameworks may be more contract-like and 
therefore enforceable if they are prepared by lawyers. 
  
Independent legal advice is not a substitute for 
screening or separate and joint counselling.  The pre-
conception process involves not only identifying potentially 
contentious issues, but also requires more skill in counselling 
and relationship building than most lawyers  have.  The parties 
are likely to be best served by an agency that provides 
screening, facilitates pre-conception relationship building, and 
assists in issue identification and decision-making. 
 
                                                     
193  Edelmann, supra note 88. 
194  Canadian Bar Association, “Reimbursement of Expenditures under 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (September 2007). 
 




 While the surrogate mother’s personal autonomy 
during the pregnancy is well protected by the common law, it 
might be instructive to the parties and others involved in the 
pregnancy, such as health care workers, to set this out 
explicitly in statute law and to require that certain standard 
terms be replicated in all surrogacy arrangement frameworks. 
Statutory terms protecting the surrogate mother’s autonomy 
could include the surrogate mother’s sole ability to make 
medical decisions, protection of personal privacy, the ability to 
withdraw information waivers, and the unenforceability of 
terms concerning diet and conduct.  Consideration should be 
given to having minimum rates of compensation for surrogacy 
(including partial payments in the event of a miscarriage), 
unless the arrangement is intended to be gratuitous, and the 
mandatory use of trust accounts to ensure that funds are 
available and that compensation and expenses are paid in a 
timely way. As well, consideration should also be given to 
whether the surrogate mother should have the right to reverse 
her decision to relinquish the child within a short period after 
giving birth regardless of the nature of the surrogacy or that she 
cannot be asked to sign a relinquishment immediately after 
birth.  Such provisions are common in adoption statutes. 195 
While almost no surrogate mothers have refused to relinquish, 
such a provision may help to ensure that her autonomy is fully 
protected, that she is well treated during the pregnancy, and 
that her consent is meaningfully given. 
 
 State-insured health care for Canadian residents has 
resulted in non-Canadian residents seeking Canadian surrogate 
mothers because this allows them to avoid having to pay 
                                                     
195  See, for example, The American Medical Association, “Opinion E-
2.18 Surrogate Mothers” (1994) (which recommends a right to 
reverse consent) and The [Manitoba] Adoption Act, supra note 27 
s.16 which provides that no one can give consent or solicit consent to 
an adoption until at least 48 hours after the time of the birth of the 
child.  
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medical expenses related to the pregnancy, delivery, and peri-
natal care.  Commissioning parents sometimes, perhaps often, 
seek Canadian surrogate mothers instead of Americans because 
surrogacy medical insurance in the United States costs in 
excess of $25,000 (for a singleton) and $40,000 (for twins).  
While it would appear these expenses must be paid for under 
provincial healthcare regimes because the services are being 
provided directly to Canadian residents, serious consideration 
should be given to requiring non-resident commissioning 
parents to pay such costs.  This burden seems unreasonable for 
Canadian taxpayers to assume.  As such expenses could easily 
exceed $50,000, this issue demands attention, especially as 
many surrogate pregnancies result in the pre-term birth of 
twins.  
    
 Only four provinces have specific laws concerning 
registration of births to surrogate mothers or on parentage; 
none have clear statutory procedural laws to expedite the 
process.  Therefore, the birth will probably be registered in the 
surrogate mother’s name alone or together with either the name 
of her husband (who is presumptively the father) or in the name 
of the commissioning father.  The commissioning parent(s) 
then adopt the child or seek a parentage declaration. As noted 
earlier, birth registration, parentage and adoption issues 
currently are decided by Canadian judges in most jurisdictions 
on an ad hoc basis.196  In the United States and Canada this 
situation leads to a kind of forum shopping whereby 
commissioning parents seek to have the children born in a 
favourable jurisdiction (for example, Ohio, where by statute 
only genetic parents are named on a birth certificate)  or, at 
least one with a more established and expedited process (for 
example, British Columbia, which permits pre-birth motions 
regarding birth registrations).  Surrogate mothers are being 
                                                     
196  See the text accompanying notes 28-40. 
 




asked to relocate just before they give birth. This situation can 
tear surrogate mothers from their families and other supports, 
such as established relationships with health care providers at 
the time when they are most needed.  Birth registration and 
parentage laws (including procedural laws) should be clarified 
across Canada.   
 
 Surrogate mothers will be best protected if the laws of 
the province where they usually reside irrevocably govern both 
parentage and the contract-like aspects of the surrogacy 
arrangement. This would discourage forum shopping and help 
ensure that she gives birth at home.  Birth registration laws of 
the place where the birth occurs obviously apply to registration, 
although the federal government should clarify the citizenship 
status of children born when either the surrogate mother or the 
commissioning parents are not residents of Canada.  
  
Canada has reciprocal arrangements with many 
countries concerning international adoptions to ensure that 
Canadians are not involved in baby-selling and other 
exploitative practices.  It also has laws with extra-territorial 
effect, such as laws prohibiting Canadian residents from 
engaging in exploitative sexual activities with minors while 
abroad.  There is evidence, albeit limited, that surrogate 
mothers in some countries are at significant risk of being 
exploited.  Consideration should be given to barring Canadian 
residents from entering surrogacy arrangements with non-
residents, either as potential surrogate mothers or 
commissioning parent(s), unless Canada has established a 
reciprocal arrangement with the non-residents’ countries.  This 
end can be accomplished, as it now is with laws relating to 
international adoptions, through criminal law sanctions and 
laws related to citizenship and residency status for children 
born to surrogate mothers where the commissioning parents are 
Canadian residents.  The form of reciprocal arrangements could 
be similar to those used to regulate and facilitate international 
92        CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 26, 2010] 
 
adoptions197 and would ensure that all surrogacy arrangements 
protect surrogate mothers’ autonomy and ability to consent, set 
standards regarding compensation and expenses and regularize 




The stories told by American and British women who have 
agreed to be surrogate mothers are quite different from the 
cautionary tale told by Atwood’s handmaid and they indicate 
that the experience of Marybeth Whitehead, the surrogate 
mother in the Baby M case, is the exception not the norm.  The 
empirical research demonstrates that concerns that commercial 
surrogacy will lead to commodification and exploitation and 
that women cannot give meaningful consent to such 
arrangements, have not been realized in those countries.  
Because participation in surrogacy in Canada is a criminal 
offense, the stories of Canadian participants are, like the stories 
of Atwood’s handmaids, only told in the whispers of mediated 
forums or confidential conversations.  The empirical research 
supports the view that women in Canada should not be denied 
the right to exercise agency over their own bodies, in particular 
their reproductive autonomy, but rather they should be legally 
able to enter into surrogacy arrangements with commissioning 
parents. 
    
 Laws regulating surrogacy arrangements will be more 
effective than an outright or partial ban on surrogacy in 
ensuring that women who agree to act as either gratuitous or 
commercial surrogate mothers are not exploited.  Additionally, 
by having a home-made solution, we may reduce our 
                                                     
197  See, for example, Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions 
(Hague Conference on Private International Law) which was entered 
into force in Canada in 1996 and subsequently adopted by all 
provincial and territorial governments.  




contribution to the exploitation of women in other countries, 
where the social and economic status of women is not 
comparable to that of most Canadian women and the statutory 
regulatory regime is less likely to control exploitative practices. 
  
 
 
 
 
